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FEDERAL INTERVENTION: II.
THE PROCEDURE, STATUS, AND FEDERAL
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
By EDWARD H. LEVI t and JAMES WM. MOOREI
IN A previous article we have traced the source of modern intervention
practice in the civil, ecclesiastical, admiralty, common law and chancery
courts.' Intervention practice in Roman law was shown to have been
rather extensive, while in England its development was slow. In equity,
intervention was permitted by a device known as an examination Pro
interesse suo. At law, it was allowed as an incidental or possessory pro-
ceeding. Both at law and in equity, and also in admiralty proceedings,
the determining factor seems to have been the presence of property in
the hands of the court. Modem intervention practice, however, has ex-
ceeded the bounds of its sources. Despite some statements to the con-
trary, intervention has been allowed under state practice even in the
absence of state statutes, and intervention under federal procedure in
most cases is even broader than under state practice.
Federal intervention has been governed by Admiralty Rules 34 and
42,2 by Equity Rule 37," by the Conformity Act,4 and by certain federal
statutes.5 Where intervention is sought in an equity suit, the normal
federal intervention case, Rule 37 will govern. If intervention is sought
in a legal action in order to present a legal claim, the state law, given
effect by the Conformity Act, will control. When the attempt is made
to present an equitable claim in a legal action, the Law and Equity Act
of 1915, which allows a defendant to set forth an equitable defense or
tAssistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
TAssistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1. Moore and Levi, Federal Intervention: I. The Right to Intervene and Reorgan-
ization (1936) 45 YALE L J. 565.
2. See id., at 570, nn. 27, 28.
3. REv. STAT. § 913 (1875), 28 U.S. C. § 723 (1934); Equity Rule 37, adopted
in 1912.
4. 17 STAT. 196 (1872), 28 U.S. C. § 724 (1934); see also §§ 915, 916 REV. STAT.
(1875).
5. 36 STAT. 539 (1910), 28 U.S.C. §§45a, 48 (1934) (Interstate Commerce
Commission) ; 49 STAT. 793 (1935), 40 U. S. C. § 276a (2b) (Supp. 1937) (contractors
for public works for United States); 42 STAT. 161 (1921) 7 U. S. C. § 193 (Packers
and Stockyards Act) (1934); 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §45 (1934) (Federal
Trade Commission); 36 STAT. 850 (1910), 48 U. S. C. §§ 401, 402 (1934) (mineral
mining in Alaska); 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), 11 U. S. C. § 205(c) (13), § 207(c) (Supp.
1937) §§ 77 and 77B of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, (reorganization proceedings);
Act of August 24, 1937, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., c. 724 (intervention by Attorney-General
where constitutionality of congressional act is questioned).
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counterclaim in a law action, becomes significant. If it is successfully
contended that the Law and Equity Act is non-applicable to interveners
inasmuch as the Act only applies to defendants and not to third parties,
the intervener must fall back on the power of a court to treat the equit-
able claim as though it were a bill in equity.
It is correct to say, then, that in the usual federal case the right to
intervene is governed by Equity Rule 37, which states that "any one
claiming an interest in the litigation may at any time be permitted to
intervene." While this rule does not appear to grant an absolute right
to intervene in any case, the practice has been to allow such a right in
certain instances, e.g., where there is property in the custody of the court
which the intervener claims as owner or upon which he claims a lien,
legal or equitable,6 or where the intervener is already represented in an
action before the court, but inadequately. The inadequacy may exist
because of collusion, diverse interests, or simply non-feasance of duty
on the part of the representative. In other cases the right to intervene
is discretionary, and is granted for the purpose of trial convenience.8
The distinction between the absolute and the discretionary right to
intervene has been incorporated into Rule 24 of the newly proposed rules
of civil procedure.' Subdivision (a) of the Rule, entitled "intervention
of right," allows intervention as of right where (1) a statute of the
United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; (2) "when
the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may
be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the
action;" or (3) "when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody
of the court or of an officer thereof." Subdivision (b) of the Rule is
entitled "permissive intervention," and allows discretionary intervention
in two cases: (1) "when a statute of the United States confers a con-
ditional right to intervene," and (2) "when an applicant's claim or de-
fense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common."
6. See 45 YAm L. J. 565, at 582. For a recent state case, see Bachellor v. Dock-
terman, 291 Ill. App. 418, 10 N. E. (2d) 42 (1937).
7. See Moore and Levi, supra note 1, at 591.
8. A petitioner who is adequately represented in the proceedings only has a dis-
cretionary right to intervene, but it is a right which becomes absolute when representa-
tion becomes inadequate. And where the proceeding is in rein, the ordinary rules of
federal jurisdictional requirements concerning discretionary intervention are not ap-
plicable. See infra, p. 926; see also Wabash Rr. v. Adelbert College of the Western
Reserve University, 208 U. S. 38 (1907). For recent cases where there vas no absolute
right to intervene see Acme-Evans Co. v. Smith, 13 F. Supp. 356 (S. D. Ind. 1936);
Washburn Crosby Co. v. Nee, 13 F. Supp. 751 (IV. D. Mo. 1936) (A. A. A. cases).
9. The April, 1937, Draft, p. 61, with the addition to Subdivision (c) (p. 61,
line 23) supplied in the November, 1937, Dnrn, at 16. For the earlier draft, see Pig-
LunNARY DRA ', May, 1936, Rule 29, at 49.
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The Rule as to discretionary intervention also states: "In exercising its
discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."
In certain instances the right to intervene is governed by special
statutes, for instance, the right to intervene in suits to enforce or set
aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission,1" the right to
intervene in proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission 1 or
before the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards
Act, 2 and the right to intervene in suits against the contractors, or their
sureties, of public works or buildings for the United States.'3 These
statutes often do not make it clear whether their intent is to give an
absolute right to intervene, or merely to provide for intervention, abso-
lute or discretionary, according to the ordinary rules of intervention.
Where a suit is brought by or against the United States to enforce
or set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Com-
mission and parties in interest to the hearing before the Commission may
intervene "as of right." Here by statute, and by dicta in some cases, the
right to intervene would seem to be absolute.14 But "communities, asso-
ciations, corporations, firms, and individuals . . . nay intervene." This
might be construed as giving only a discretionary right to intervene, or
as a grant of a general right to intervene with an application of equity
practice as to whether the right is absolute or discretionary in any par-
ticular case.' 5
In hearings before the Federal Trade Commission, a§ in those
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, the right to inter-
vene appears to be governed by ordinary rules concerning intervention,
although the language of the statute is entirely permissive."0 This seems
10. 36 STAT. 543 (1910), 28 U.S.C. §45a (1934).
11. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1934).
12. 42 STAT. 161 (1921), 7 U. S. C. § 193 (1934).
13. 49 STAT. 793 (1935), 40 U. S. C. § 276a(2b) (Supp. 1937).
14. "The present appellants were parties in the court below, as of right, and not by
grace or favor . . . " See Alexander Sprunt & Sons v. United States, 281 U. S. 249,
255 (1930); Kansas City Southern Ry. v. United States, 282 U. S. 760, 763 (1931).
15. It is not clear whether this allows intervention by an unincorporated associa-
tion which lacks capacity to sue or be sued under the law of the state in which the
district court sits. There is a dictum that they may [Moffatt Tunnel League v. United
States, 289 U. S. 113, 120 (1933)], although they were not able to come under this
provision to bring an original suit to set aside an order of the Commission. Ibid. This
latter difficulty is solved by Federal Rule 17(b) which provides that an unincorporated
association or partnership having no capacity to sue or be sued by the law of the state
in which the district court is held "may sue or be sued in its common name for the
purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing under the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States." DA~rr, April, 1937, at 47.
16. 38 STAT. 719 (1914),' 15 U.S.C. §45 (1934). "Any person, partnership, or
corporation may make application, and upon good cause shown may be allowed by the
Commission to intervene and appear in said proceeding by counsel or in person."
(Vol. 47: 898
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to be the case also in hearings before the Secretary of Agriculture under
the Packers and Stockyards Act begun by complaint of the Secretary
against a packer for violation of the Act.' Again the statute is per-
missive: "Any person for good cause shown may on application be al-
lowed by the Secretary to intervene." But a person with an absolute
right under ordinary rules probably would have an absolute right here.
Prior to the Act of August 24, 1935, persons furnishing labor and ma-
terials to contractors of public buildings for the United States were given
the right to intervene in proceedings against the contractor or the con-
tractors by the United States. If the United States did not bring the
action, a creditor might sue in the name of the United States for the
use of creditors generally. Only one action could be brought, although
other creditors could file their claims in the action and be made parties."8
At the present time any creditor may sue on the bond in the name of
the United States.19 While the right on the bond is no longer limited
to one action, such creditors apparently still have an absolute right to
intervene in an action brought by another creditor, as was formerly
provided in the statute. In addition, laborers and mechanics working
for the contractors are expressly given the same absolute right of inter-
vention as is given these creditors."
In private litigation concerning the orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the United States "may intervene" where public interests
are involved.2 Here the language is permissive, but it is clear that the
intent was to confer an absolute right.-- The United States may inter-
vene now as of right in any court of the United States when the con-
stitutionality of any act of Congress affecting the public interest is ques-
tioned; the government becomes a party for the presentation of evidence
17. 42 STAT. 161 (1921), 7 U. S. C. § 193 (1934).
18. 28 STAT. 278 (1894), 40 U.S. C. §270 (1934).
19. 49 STAT. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. §270b (Supp. 1937).
20. 49 STAT. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 276a(2b) (Supp. 1937); see Theobald-Jansen
Electric Co. v. Meyer Co., 77 F. (2d) 27 (C. C.A. 10th, 1935).
21. 36 STAT. 542 (1910), 28 U. S. C. § 48 (1934).
22. The inability of the federal or state government to intervene as of right in
proceedings affecting the public interest finds a counterpart in other legal systems,
as, for e:mple, Germany. Deak and Rheinstein, The Machinery of Low AdmiriLstra-
gion in France aid Germany (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 846, 865. In this country,
special state statutes give the attorney general of the state the right to intervene in
certain state court proceedings, such as divorce cases, [see, e.g., GA. Coo- (1933)
c. 30-124], but in the absence of such statutes there is no absolute right to intervene.
It contrast with the limited right to intervene granted to the sovereign in this country,
is the right granted in France to the public ministry. Deak- and Rheinstein, sspro,
at 857. The parquet in France has the duty to intervene in all cases affecting public
policy, and he is a party in all cases which reach the Court of Cassation, even though
these cases may not involve public policy directly.
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dealing with the constitutionality of the act.2" The final draft of the
Federal Rules provides that "when the constitutionality of an act of
Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question in any action
to which the United States or an officer, agency, or employee thereof
is not a party, the court shall notify the Attorney General of the United
States."24
The right to intervene in reorganization proceedings is governed by
special provisions in the reorganization acts.2" These acts, again, are
obscure as to whether an absolute or discretionary right to intervene is
granted, or whether ordinary intervention practice is to be applicable.
Further, these acts may be thought to distinguish between a right to be
heard and a right to intervene and become a party. We have discussed
these provisions in detail in our previous article, and shall discuss them
later in this article when we apply" the rules concerning the procedure,
status and federal jurisdictional requirements of interveners to the re-
organization situation.2"
The nature of his right to intervene is of course only one problem
facing the intervener. The additional problems concerning the intervener
in the federal courts may be classified roughly as dealing with (1) the
procedure for intervention; (2) the status of the intervener; and (3)
the federal jurisdictional requirements in their relation to intervention.
These problems are only partially solved by the proposed rules of civil
procedure, which are somewhat specific as to the procedure for inter-
vention, but which do not cover, save possibly by 'implication, the status
of the intervener or the problem of jurisdictional requirements. In com-
pleting this study of federal intervention, we shall discuss these three
general problems, again applying the distinctions made to the reorgan-
ization field. In so doing we shall of course rely heavily on the distinc-
tion already made between the absolute and the discretionary right to
intervene. The absolute right to intervene connotes that the intervener's
interest in the proceeding is so great that in justice he must be allowed
to protect his interest in the case. It is to be expected that the status of
such an intervener and the jurisdictional requirements which he must
meet may well be different than the status of, and the jurisdictional
23. Act of August 24, 1937, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., c. 754. See Hinderleder v.
The LaPlata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Company, 58 Sup. Ct. 123 (1937) (memo.)
where the court "invites the Attorney-General to submit his views upon the question"
of whether the act was applicable. See Comment (1937) 51 HAuv. L. Rav. 148.
24. November, 1937, DRArr at 16.
25. §§ 77(c) (13), 77B (c) (11), 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), 11 U. S. C. §§ 205, 207 (Supp.
1937). See also § 14d of H. R. 8046, the proposed revision of the Bankruptcy Act,
which provides for the intervention of the United States district attorney in bankruptcy
proceedings to oppose a discharge when requested by the court.
26. See infra, p. 933.
[Vol. 47: 898902
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requirements for, an intervener whose right to intervene is discretionary
and is granted only for the purpose of trial convenience.
I. THE PROCEDURE OF INTERVENTION
Subdivision (c) of Rule 24 of the federal rules is somewhat specific
on the procedure to be followed in intervention. It states:.
"A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene
upon all parties affected thereby. The motion shall state the grounds
therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the
claim or defense for which intervention is sought. The same pro-
cedure shall be followed when a statute of the United States gives a
right to intervene. When the constitutionality of an act of Congress
affecting the public interest is drawn in question in any action to
which the United States or an officer, agency, or employee thereof
is not a party, the court shall notify the Attorney General of the
United States as provided in the Act of August 24, 1937."
The best discussion of intervention procedure in the past is to be found
in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Port Lobos Petroleum Corp.2- There a stock-
holder was allowed to intervene to file an answer in a suit against his
corporation. The court, after discussing proper intervention practice,
concluded, inter alia, that (1) a petition of intervention may be filed
only by leave of court; (2) the mere filing does not make the petitioner
a party to the cause; (3) after filing the petition, notice should be given
and hearing had; (4) the hearing should be followed by an order deny-
ing or granting leave to the petitioner to intervene and become a party;
(5) the petition must present a well pleaded defense. It has been possible
in the past for the plaintiff or defendant to waive these procedural re-
quirements as to the intervener.' But up to the present time there has
been no settled uniform practice in regard to proper procedure on inter-
vention, a result that is doubtless partially due to tie haphazard manner
in which the courts have often treated intervention.
The federal Rule, however, does adopt the essence of the procedure
advocated in the Atlantic Refining Company case. There are some dif-
ferences. Leave of court is not required for the filing of the petition
to intervene, which is called a motion under the new Rule. The state-
ment of the Supreme Court in Chandler v. Brandtieu & Kluge" that
27. April, 1937, DRAPT at 61.
28. 280 Fed. 934 (D. Del. 1922).
29. See Perry v. Godbe, 82 Fed. 141 (D. Nev. 1897).
30. 296 U. S. 53 (1935); Toler v. East Tenn. V. & G. Ry., 67 Fed. 163 (E.D.
Tenn. 1894). See also Lombard Investment Co. v. Seaboard Mfg. Co., 74 Fed. 325
(S. D. Ala. 1896), where it vras said the intervener should give notice of his application
for intervention. United States v. Houde Engineering Corp., 9 F. Supp. (NV. D.
N. Y. 1935).
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according to the "better practice" an applicant to intervene for a defensive
purpose ought to present a proposed answer, and the recommendation
of the Atlantic Refining Company case on this point have been extended
in the Rule to all interveners, whether the proposed pleading be defensive
or aggressive.
Intervention should normally be early in the proceedings. 81 It may be
allowed after the proceedings are well under way, but this depends upon
the amount of administrative inconvenience caused, and also upon whether
the right to intervene is absolute or discretionary."2 The trial court may
not allow intervention in the proceedings after the appeal has been ar-
gued,"3 although in an unusual case intervention may be allowed in the
appellate proceedings.34 The problem of the late intervener has a differ-
ent aspect which affects his status,"5 for the late intervener normally is
bound by prior orders and evidence taken and may be prevented from
raising issues which more properly should have been raised at an earlier
date. But it is useful to keep the status aspect separate from the problem
of when an intervention petition will be granted by the court.
The proposed intervention rule states that the motion to intervene
shall be "served upon all parties affected thereby,"8" but does not outline
the manner of service. The rule, however, should be interpreted as
allowing service on the parties' attorneys under the rather liberal terms
of Rule. 5 concerning service and filing of pleadings and other papers
unless this is negatived by the court.3 7 Where an original party is in
default for failure to appear, however, it seems probable that service
as to him must be made as required under Rule 4 for the service of
process.38
The proposed complaint or answer of the intervener must state a well
pleaded claim or defense." On the application for intervention, the well
31. Late intervention, where intervention is of right, is usually a problem of status,
but timely application is important. See Seligman v. City of Santa Rosa, 81 Fed. 524
(N. D. Cal. 1897); Lamb v. Bonds & Dillard Drilling Corp., 107 S. W. (2d) 50D
(Tex. 1935).
32. Gaines v. Clark, 275 Fed. 1017 (App. D. C. 1921); Central State Trust Co.
of N. Y. v. Cincinnati, H. & R. Ry., 169 Fed. 466 (S. D. Ohio, 1908).
33. United States v. Radice, 40 F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
34. United States Casualty Co. v. Taylor, 64 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
35. See infra, p. 917.
36. Rule 24(c). April, 1937, DRAFT at 61.
37. April, 1937, DRAFT at 15. For substituted service upon the attorneys of the
original party by the intervener, see Gasquet v. Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co.,
57 Fed. 80 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893), where such service was held sufficient.
38. April, 1937, DRFT at 7. Rule 5 expressly excepts those in default for failure
to appear in subdivision (a).
39. Continental & Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 200
Fed. 600 (E. D. Wis. 1912).
[Vol. 47: 898
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pleaded allegations will be taken as true.40 Ordinary rules of procedure
will control the interpretation of the pleading.41 Thus in pleading fraud
it will be necessary to state facts in some detail.' An intervening share-
holder cannot avoid the rules requiring shareholders who desire to pre-
sent a corporate defense to state that the directors have been asked to
take action and have refused, or that through reason of fraud such a
request would be meaningless and therefore unnecessary. 43 Whether a
good defense is stated is, of course, a problem of substantive law. Thus
in the Equitable Trust Co. case, 44 where stockholders desired to prove
a note issue was ultra vires and void as to the corporation, the court
pointed out that the corporation could not raise the defense while retain-
ing the benefits of the transaction, and that therefore the stockholder
would not be aided by that defense.
Interveners will be subject to the general pleading and procedure rules,
e.g., rules on joinder of actions and parties.4 If intervention is denied,
there is a right to appeal from the order denying intervention only if
the right to intervene was absolute, unless the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in denying the discretionary right to intervene."0 But it could
seldom, if ever, be shown that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the permissive right to intervene. Once intervention has been
allowed, the intervener has the right to appeal from all interlocutory and
final orders which affect him and from which an appeal is given by
statute, whether the right under which he intervened was originally abso-
lute or discretionary.47 In straight bankruptcy and in reorganizations
through bankruptcy an appeal will be as of right or by permission depend-
ing upon the issue involved and whether it comes within Section 24
or Section 25 of the Bankruptcy Act.
40. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Port Lobos Petroleum Corp., 2E0 Fed. 934 (D. Del.
1922); United States v. Northern Securities Co., 128 Fed. S08 (S. D. Minn. 1904).
41. Watson v. National Life and Trust Co., 162 Fed. 7 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903).
42. Continental & Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 200
Fed. 600 (E. D. Wis. 1912).
43. In re Eureka Anthracite Coal Co., 197 Fed. 216 (V. D. Ark. 1912). See
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 283 (1936); McLaughlin,
Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholder to Terminate a Stocbholder's Suit (1937) 46 YAxs
L. J. 421.
44. Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Washington-Idaho Water, Light &
Power Co., 300 Fed. 601 (E. D. Wash. 1924).
45. Rules 18, 19, 20.
46. Fix parte Matter of Leaf Tobacco Board of Trade of N. Y. 222 U. S. 578
(1911) ; see In re Engelhard & Sons Co., 231 U. S. 646 (1914) ; United States v. Radice,
40 F. (2d) 445 (C. C.A. 2d, 1930).
47. Wiliams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 684 (1884); Michigan Cent. R.R., 124 Fed.
727 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903); Jones & Laughlins, Ltd. v. Sands, 79 Fed. 913 (C. C. A.
2d, 1897).
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An intervener must be sharply distinguished from a mere amicus
curiae or a person who has been heard but has never intervened.48 Thus
stockholders, who file petitions 'of intervention which are never acted
upon, or bondholders whose petition for intervention is dismissed, may
not appeal from a final order entered later in the proceedings, since they
were not parties to the action.49 Since in the past an allowance of an
appeal has been necessary if the court refused to grant an appeal, the
remedy has been to secure mandamus from the appellate court.60 Because
of the difficulty of determining whether the right to intervene is absolute
or discretionary, it has been suggested that permission to appeal should
be given in every case. 1 The appeal would then be dismissed if the
right to intervene were only discretionary and the trial court had not
abused its discretion in denying intervention. 2 In common practice, how-
ever, upon deciding that the right to intervene was only discretionary,
the appellate court has not dismissed the appeal, but rather has affirmed
the order denying admission."
The same general theory will apply under the Rules. The procedure,
however, has been changed. In the usual case where the appeal is to
a circuit court of appeals, the applicant for intervention whose petition
has been denied would file a notice of appeal, and further proceed in
accordance with Rules 73, 74, 75 and 76, which deal with the perfecting
of an appeal and the record thereon. If the appeal were from an order
denying the discretionary right, the circuit court of appeals could dismiss
the appeal unless abuse of discretion were shown. But since this will
involve some examination of the record, the practice in all cases, whether
the right is absolute or discretionary, will probably conform to that of
the past, i.e., an examination of the merits of the intervener's claim.
48. See Moore and Levi, .upra note 1, at 568, n. 11.
49. Ex parte Cutting, 94 U. S. 14 (1876); Matter of Kenrmore-Granville Hotel
Co., 92 F. (2d) 778 (C. C.A. 7th, 1937).
50. See Richfield Oil Co. v. Sawtelle, 279 Fed. 851 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921); cf. In re
Engelhard & Sons Co., 231 U. S. 646 (1914).
51. United States v. Philips, 107 Fed. 824 (C. C.A. 8th, 1901). The necessity for
appeal would be decreased if the order denying intervention did so without prejudice or
stated that it did so because the -intervener's interest was not sufficient to justify an
absolute right to intervene and the court felt that trial convenience would suffer from
intervention. This would remove the possibility of the denial being res adjudicata as
to the merits of the intervener's claim. See Trust Co. of America v. Norfolk & S. Ry.,
174 Fed. 269 (E. D. Va. 1909).
52. Palmer v. Bankers' Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
53. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of Phoenix, Ariz. v. Ariz. Mut. Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 220 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915); Radford Iron- Co., Inc. v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 62 F. (2d) 940 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933); United States Trust Co. of New
York v. Miller, 262 U. S. 58 (1923).
[Vol. 47: 898
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Normally the appeal itself will follow the procedure for appeal of
the main proceedings. 4 If this procedure were limited to appeal to the
circuit court of appeals, an appeal of the intervener will be similarly lim-
ited, even though the intervener's claim is of such nature that in an
independent proceeding he would be entitled to a right of appeal to the
Supreme Court.r5
II. THE STATUS OF THE INTERVENER
Equity Rule 37 provided that "intervention shall be in subordination
to and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding." '' This
requirement was suggested by the bar committee of the Circuit Court
of Appeals of the Eighth CircuitY The requirement is ambiguous. Lit-
erally applied, a third person would always be precluded from inter-
vention as a defendant to challenge the plaintiff's claim. Yet manufac-
turers are commonly allowed to intervene and present a defense to a
patent infringement action brought against a dealer.' s But when a person
is allowed to intervene and present a defense in the same manner as an
original defendant, it is a misuse of language to say that such inter-
vention is in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the
main proceeding. Trouble and confusion lurk in the ambiguities of the
requirement.
Whzittaker v. Brictson Manufacturing Co. 0 is the crowning example
of its danger. In this action certain creditors apparently in agreement
54. Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 47 (1895); Gregory v. Van Ee, 160 U. S. 643
(1896) ; Begg v. New York City, 262 U. S. 196 (1923) ; United States v. Northwestern
Development Co., 203 Fed. 960 (C. C.A. 9th, 1913); Barrett v. Commercial Credit
Co., 296 Fed. 996 (App. D. C. 1924).
55. Cf. Whittington v. Smith, 16 F. Supp. 448 (E. D. Te. 1936) where in a
suit before a three-judge court to restrain certain officials of Texas from enforcing its
conservation law, questions between interveners and plaintiff were by agreement sub-
mitted to and were to be decided by a single judge. If this procedure is followed, the
appeal in the main proceeding will be direct to the United States Supreme Court, vlule
the appeal on the issues between the plaintiff and the interveners will be to the circuit
court of appeals. The three-judge court, however, dismissed plaintiff's bill, and stated
that the case between plaintiff and interveners fell with it.
56. R-v. STAT. §913 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 723 (1934); Equity Rule 37, adopted
in"1912.
57. See HoPINs, FEm.nAL EQurry RuLx.s (1933) 232; Consolidated Gas Co. v.
Newton, 256 Fed. 238 (S. D. N. Y. 1919); State of North Carolina v. Southern Ry.,
30 F. (2d) 204, 208 (C. C..A. 4th, 1929); see also Bancroft v. Allen, 174 So. 749,
761 (Fla. 1937).
58. See infra, p. 921.
59. 43 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930); cf. Zeitinger v. Hargardine-McKittrilc
Dry Goods Co., 244 Fed. 719 (C. C.A. 8th, 1917) where the court permitted inter-
vention of the stockholder to contest a voluntary bankruptcy petition filed by the cor-
poration, without any mention of Equity Rule 37.
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with Brictson, the controlling figure of the manufacturing company,
secured a default judgment against the company for $51,000. Service
in the action was made upon one Breed, a supposed director of the
company, a 72-year old gentleman living on a farm, who had been so
ill for ten months prior to service that it had been impossible for him
to move from one place to another without assistance, and who was so
little interested in the matter that he did not advise any officers of the
company of the service upon him. He had been a director, having been
given one share of stock by Brictson in 1923. In 1923 he had attended
one meeting of the board of directors, but since that time had received
no notice of any directors' meeting and had attended none prior to the
litigation, which was in 1929. Soon after this default judgment an in-
voluntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the corporation, service
was again made upon Breed, and adjudication had. Stockholders and
creditors of tile corporation sought to intervene soon thereafter in the
case in which the default judgment had been entered, and in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding, to set aside the default judgment and the adjudication
of bankruptcy. The petitions were denied because of the requirement
in question. Small wonder that the Eighth Circuit, which had sponsored
the requirement, should deploringly observe :6
"If we could see any legal way in which we could, without doing
violence to well-established rules of equity, set aside these judg-
ments and permit the interveners to contest the question of insolv-
ency and the amount of the attorney's fees (the default judgment),
we would do so, but in the condition of this record our hands are
tied by Equity Rule 37 . . . They (interveners) do not attempt
to come into the action as interveners in subordination to the main
proceedings but in defiance thereto. To seek to set aside the entire
proceedings in a case and to have the same held for naught on the
ground that they were absolutely void cannot be in recognition of
the propriety of the main suit. We are forced somewhat reluctantly
to the conclusion that appellants come under the prohibition of
Equity Rule 37 . . . "
Had the court realized that the rule of subordination was construed gen-
erally to effect a workable procedure it could have avoided the harsh
result. The rule of subordination probably was designed to preclude an
intervener from raising frivolous issues, attacking administrative orders
already made, interfering with the general control of the litigation, and
unduly delaying such litigation. In a great many cases the requirement
has been used by courts to thwart such tactics in interveners and also
as a make-weight argument in denying the merits of an intervention.
60. 43 F. (2d) 485, 489.
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The May, 1936 draft of the Rules stated that:6 '
"An intervener shall have the right to litigate the claim or defense
for which he intervenes on the merits; and new parties may be
brought in when necessary to adjudicate fully the claim of the inter-
venor."
No comparable provision was contained in the April, 1937 draft, nor
the final draft. But the intervention rule does not state, as did Equity
Rule 37, that intervention must be subordinate to the main proceedings.
By implication, therefore, the rule negatives the subordination require-
ment of old Equity Rule 37. With the subordination requirement of
Equity Rule 37 omitted, it was superfluous to add that the intervener
could litigate on the merits the claim or defense for which the interven-
tion was permitted. Further, Rule 13 on Counterclaim and Cross-claim
in the April, 1937 draft was expanded to include all parties to an action,
and was not delimited to the defendant as was Equity Rule 30 and Rule
18 of the May, 1936 draft which dealt with Counterclaim and Cross-
claim. It was, therefore, unnecessary to provide expressly that an inter-
vener could counterclaim and bring in third parties. He may do so if the
pleading which he proposes to file when he seeks intervention shows that
he desires to press a counterclain; otherwise he will be permitted to
amend that proposed pleading in the sound discretion of the court to state
a counterclaim. A strict interpretation of Rule 13 might limit that rule
to original defendants, and thus preserve the doctrine of Chandler &
Price v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc.,62 but such an interpretation would
not do justice to the plain language of the rule.
Cases construing the subordination requirement of Equity Rule 37
will be helpful in indicating the utility and the danger of a rule which
deals with subordination. Those that preclude a hearing of the inter-
vener's claim or defense on the merits should no longer be regarded as
persuasive. Those that keep intervention within bounds-by precluding
the intervener from raising frivolous issues, from attacking adminis-
trative orders already made, from interfering with the general control
of the litigation, and from unduly delaying such litigation-are helpful
because of their inherent good sense. 3
Cases concerning the intervener's status which are often dealt with
under the heading of subordination may be grouped into four classes:
61. Rule 29, p. 50 of the Par~mrn;AR, DRA-r.
62. 296 U. S. 53 (1935), discussed infra, p. 924.
63. State provisions generally do not delimit the status of the intervener. See
Moore and Levi, supra note 1, at 575-577. Two exceptions are Florida and Michigan.
FLA. Com. GEN. LAws AxNq. (Skillman, Supp. 1934) § 4918(2); Mxcu. Cosp. LAws
(1929) § 14019. But the Michigan provision is not as sweeping as the federal equity
rule: intervention is to be "in subordination to and in recognition of the propriety of
the main proceeding, unless otheruise ordered by uhe Court in its discrelion:'
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subordination (properly speaking), prior orders and decrees, counter-
claims and the right to bring in third parties, and future orders.
SUBORDINATION
The subordination rule limits the kinds of questions which the inter-
vener may raise in the proceeding and operates differently as to each.
These questions may be roughly classified as three: (1) the real juris-
diction of the court, i.e., the power of the court to pronounce a judg-
ment good against collateral attack; (2) the assumption of jurisdiction
over the proceedings, i.e., whether the court in its discretion should have
proceeded in the action; (3) the merits of a claim or defense. In most
cases the operation of the subordination rule is dependent upon whether
the intervener has an absolute right to intervene or only a discretionary
right allowed for the purpose of trial convenience.
Lack of Real Jurisdiction. An intervener, no matter whether his right
to intervene be discretionary or absolute, may question the court's real
jurisdiction over the subject matter. A lack of real jurisdiction must be
taken account of by the court itself, and no matter how the question is
raised, a court will have to dismiss proceedings over which it lacks such
jurisdiction. That an intervener may question the lack of real jurisdiction
is indicated in Scattergood v. American Pipe,14 where the debtor corpora-
tion had not objected to the improper venue and had consented to the
appointment of a receiver. An intervening stockholder raised the question
of the lack of jurisdiction and the propriety of the appointment of the
receiver. The court states that as to the lack of jurisdiction, "either the
District court or this court would be bound to take note of that fact
(however the knowledge might be acquired) and to dismiss the bill
of its own motion."8 5 The court concluded, however, that there was
real jurisdiction over the proceedings: (1) there was diversity of citi-
zenship and the requisite amount in controversy; and (2) there was
corporate property within the district. It refused to hear the intervener's
claim that the property within the district was insufficient to warrant
the appointment of a receiver, i.e., the propriety of the court proceeding
in the action. This refusal seems proper, because unless the directors of
the corporation are acting fraudulently they represent adequately all
stockholders on such administrative questions as to where the receiver-
ship should proceed.6"
64. 249 Fed. 23 (C. C.A. 3d, 1918); cf. In re Veach, 4 F. (2d) 334 (C. C.A.
8th, 1925) where it was said an intervener might not raise the question of whether an
indispensable party had not been joined. But the court decided the issue on its merits,
concluding that the party was not only not indispensable but improper.
65. 249 Fed. 23, 25 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918).
66. See Moore and Levi, supra note 1, at 591 et seq.
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In Cochrane v. Potts Sons & Co.,"7 intervention was allowed state
trustees of various security issues for the purpose of contesting the
jurisdiction of the federal court. They denied its power to appoint a
receiver over collateral underlying their issues in a proceeding begun
by a plaintiff who, it was alleged, had no interest in their collateral. The
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the collateral securities in question
turned over to the interveners on the theory that the federal court had
no jurisdiction over that subject matter, i.e., over the collateral securities
in which plaintiff was not interested. To be sure, one can frequently
find courts stating that the intervener may not question the jurisdiction
of the court, but in these cases usually something other than real juris-
diction is meant.68
Just as any intervener may raise the question of a lack of real juris-
diction, because the court is bound to take notice of this defect itself,
intervention will not serve as a means of conferring real jurisdiction."C
On the other hand, even though the action was improperly brought and
should, and eventually will, be dismissed, the court may retain jurisdiction
to adjudicate issues raised by interveners when necessary to do justice.70
Propriety of Proceeding. In many cases the court has what we have
termed real jurisdiction, but the contention is nevertheless made that the
court should not proceed further with the action because of its improper
assumption of jurisdiction. The largest group of cases in this category
are those where a receivership was begun on an unsecured creditor's
67. 47 F. (2d) 1027 (C.C.A. 5th, 1931).
68. The court in In re Veach, 4 F. (2d) 334 (C. C. A. Sth, 1925) apparently did
mean that the intervener could not question its real jurisdiction, but it went on to con-
sider thi question on its merits, concluding that such jurisdiction actually was present.
See also Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 61 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) where there
was a collateral attack on the decrees passed by a federal circuit judge sitting as a
district judge, as being allegedly void since the appointment of the receiver by the
circuit judge was in violation of the rules of the district judges. The collateral attacl:
failed, the court stating that a direct attack could have been made through intervention
despite the subordination rule. This does not seem to have involved real jurisdiction.
But since the attack was on the power of the receiver, representation would be inadequate
for shareholders (despite the consent of the defendants) and the right to intervene and
attack discretionary jurisdiction would be absolute. Further, the order of the court
stated that "the defendant or other party in interest may be heard."
69. Cochrane v. Potts, 47 F. (2d) 1027 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); cf. Pusey & Jones
Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491 (1923); Hill v. Wilson, 210 Fed. 200 (C.C.A. 5th,
1914); Richards v. Chesapeake, 20 Fed. Cas. 692 (Va. 1876); See also Brictson Mfg.
Co. v. Woodrough, 284 Fed. 484 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922); Board of Drainage Comm. of
Pender County v. Lafayette, 27 F. (2d) 286 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928); Belmont Nail Co. v.
Columbia Iron & Steel Co., 46 Fed. 336 (NV. D. Pa. 1891); Pianta v. IL M. Reich, 77 F.
(2d) 888 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
70. Electrical Supply Co. v. Put-in-Bay Waterworks, Light and Railay Co., 84
Fed. 740 (N. D. Ohio, 1898) ; see McKinney v. Black Panther, 280 Fed. 486 (C. C. A.
8th, 1922).
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bill without execution returned unsatisfied, or where the court assumed
jurisdiction over a corporation through a receivership when the corpora-
tion's main assets or domicile were in another venue, but where the
corporation had waived the venue defense. Both of these cases represent
instances where, under certain conditions, it may be argued that an
assumption of jurisdiction may be an abuse of discretion. Indeed, the
status of a receivership begun on an unsecured creditor's bill without
execution returned unsatisfied has never been satisfactorily settled, but
it has been pointed out that the doubt concerns not what we have termed
real jurisdiction, but rather the propriety of giving receivership relief.71
The intervener who desires to raise such a question has, of course, been
met with the subordination rule. It would seem that if the intervener's
right to intervene is absolute, he will be able to successfully raise this
question; on the other hand, if the inteyrvener's right is discretionary
and he is permitted to intervene to facilitate the litigation of his claim
or defense, he will not be permitted to argue that the court should not
proceed further. The cases denying the intervener's right to raise the
question of an improper assumption of jurisdiction are, with one pos-
sible exception,72 cases in which the intervener's right was only discre-
tionary and in which, furthermore, the court decided the issue on its
merits against the intervener.
The rule that an intervener with an absolute right to intervene may
contest the discretionary jurisdiction of the court finds some support in
the dictum in Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Jones.7" There the in-
tervener, without an absolute right to intervene, desired to question the
propriety of an equity receivership begun on an unsecured creditor's bill.
The court, in stating that the intervener with a discretionary right to
intervene could not question this type of jurisdiction, pointed out that
the intervener was neither a necessary nor a proper party in the litigation.
It may be possible to construe this statement as meaning that the inter-
vener's interest in the litigation was not sufficiently great to justify his
raising this type of question. There is an implication that the intervener's
interest would be sufficiently great, if he had an absolute right to inter-
vene, for in those cases his interest in property is in grave jeopardy or
he is already a party to the proceeding but inadequately represented. In
Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge," stockholders and creditors, who ap-
71. See Sabel, Equity Jurisdiction in the United States Courts with Reference to
Consent Receiverships (1934) 19 IowA L. Ryv. 406, 540, (1934) 20 IowA L. Ray. 83, 97.
72. Whittaker v. Brictson Manufacturing Co., 43 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930),
discussed mtpra, p. 907. And the dictum in Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 61 F. (2d) 934
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932) would allow the intervener to raise the question of an improper
assumption of jurisdiction.
73. 16 F. (2d) 236 (C. C.A. 4th, 1926).
74. 151 U. S. 129 (1894).
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parently had no absolute right to intervene, unsuccessfully questioned the
propriety of a receivership over the corporation in a district outside the
corporate domicil. The court in the Scattergood case," in explaining the
McGeorge case, points out that the stockholders and creditors would have
been able to raise the question of a lack of real jurisdiction; they could
not, however, question the discretion of the court in assuming jurisdic-
tion where the corporation had waived its right not to be sued in a
district outside its domicil. In Primos Chemical Co. v. Fulton Steel
Corporation,76 the court had taken jurisdiction through an equity re-
ceivership over a debtor who had only personal property in the district
of the court. Judge Augustus Hand held that the court did have juris-
diction, and stated that the interveners could not raise the question of
whether the court in its discretion should have taken jurisdiction where
the original defendants had appeared voluntarily and submitted to the
jurisdiction. The interveners in the Primos case had only a discretionary
right to intervene.77
Contesting the Merits of a Claim or Defense. Finally, the intervener
may desire to question the merits of a claim or defense. Thus he may
desire (1) to question whether the allegations of the complaint are suffi-
cient, or (2) to contest a claimant's right to a certain amount of damages,
or (3) to press a claim of his own which will have the effect of reducing
the value of other claims.
There seems to be no doubt that an intervener having an absolute
right to intervene can raise any one of these issues.7 It would be mean-
ingless to give him an absolute right to intervene in order to protect his
interest, if once in the proceeding he were barred from raising questions
necessary for his own protection. Thus in Harrison v. Nixon..0 the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Story, allowed the claimants
of a fund in the hands of the executor to intervene ten years after the
death of the testator and nearly six months after the final decree and
to point out successfully that the entire proceeding in the circuit court
was a nullity because of a failure to allege the domicil of the testator.
75. 249 Fed. 23, 25 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918).
76. 255 Fed. 427 (S. D. N. Y. 1918).
77. Ibid.
78. McGraw v. Mott, 179 Fed. 646 (C. C.A. 4th, 1910); Clymore Production Co.
v. Thompson, 11 F. Supp. 791 (NV. D. Te=. 1935).
79. 9 Pet 483 (U. S. 1835). Note the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Baldw-in.
"A final decree of a circuit court, rendered in a long-pending and zealously contested
cause, after the fullest consideration, has not only been reversed, but all its proceedings
so completely annulled as to open the case to new parties, new bills, pleadings, issues
and evidence; and to make it necessary to begin de novo, in the same manner as if
the Court had never acted on any question which could arise." Id., at 506. This case
should be remembered in connection with the ordinary applicable rule that an inter-
vener is bound by prior decrees. See infra, p. 916.
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It may be suggested, also, that an intervener who has only a discre-
tionary right to intervene should also be allowed to raise any one of these
objections insofar as these claims are antagonistic to the claim or defense
for which he is permitted to intervene. It is clear that these questions
may unduly burden the proceedings when raised by one having only a
discretionary right to intervene. The remedy, however, is to deny inter-
vention, or at least to allow intervention only for limited purposes.8" If
the proper procedure for intervention is followed, the court may allow
intervention either generally or specially upon the basis of the pleading
which the intervener proposes to file. It would seem quixotic, however,
to allow intervention, and then to deny the intervener the right to present
his claim or defense, because in doing so, as will often be the case, he
is forced to attack a claim or defense or to reduce the value of other
claims.
If trial convenience will not be served by a presentation of the inter-
vener's claim or defense, the permissive right to intervene for that pur-
pose should be denied. Many cases denying intervention are explainable
on this ground. Thus persons claiming an equitable lien on securities
have been denied intervention in a suit for the return of those securities,
where the court denied the equitable lien, and where the intervener sought
to contest the plaintiff's right, in his capacity as statutory receiver, to
sue for the securities. 8' A state has been denied the right to intervene
in a receivership in order to show that the purpose of the receivership
is the final step in the consummation of an illegal merger or consolida-
tion."' The heir of a settlor has been denied the right to contest the
present validity of a trust, when the main proceeding involved an attempt
to discover whether the consolidation of Leander Clark College and Coe
College was in violation of the terms of the trust fund or whether the
fund should be applied cy pres.83 Intervention has been denied to a
discretionary intervener for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff
80. Thus where a judgment creditor brought a creditor's bill against a corporation
to reach its equity in property mortgaged by it, a stockholder substantially interested
in the corporate defendant was not allowed to intervene to raise questions in issue in
a state court proceeding between applicant and the corporation on one side and the
plaintiff on the other relative to a stock and bond transaction. The issues were thought
to be dissimilar, and trial convenience best served by allowing the federal and state
court litigation to proceed separately. Coffin v. Chattanooga Water & Power Co.,
44 Fed. 533 (S. D. Tenn. 1891). See Universal Oil Products Co. v. Standard Oil Co.
of Indiana, 6 F. Supp. 37 (W. D. Mo. 1934).
81. Hopkins v. Lancaster, 254 Fed. 190 (N. D. Ala. 1918). The court, while
denying the right of the intervener to raise these questions, did dispose of these ques-
tions on their merits, as is often the case in intervention cases.
82. State of North Carolina v. Southern Ry., 30 F. (2d) 204 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
83. Schell v. Leander Clark College, 10 F. (2d) 542 (N. D. Ia. 1926).
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was not the real party in interest, even though if this had been proved the
court might have lacked jurisdiction."4
It may be suggested, however, that if the problem of the discretionary
intervenor were treated as one of trial convenience, and not as a matter
generally involving a problem of subordination, many cases denying in-
tervention ostensibly on a basis of the subordination rule would have
been decided differently. For instance, the Eighth Circuit has denied
intervention to creditors in a foreclosure proceeding for the purpose of
contesting the validity of the trust *deed." While the denial cannot be
said to have been improper, assuming the representation of the creditors
in the proceedings was adequate, the court apparently denied interven-
tion because the interveners could not attack the validity of the trust
deed since "it was the trust deed which had produced the fund in court." 8 0
Since the validity of the trust deed is a matter of real concern in the
main litigation, there seems to be no purpose in delaying the discussion
of its validity until after the decree of sale when the creditors would
have an interest in a fund in court and an absolute right to intervene.
Trial convenience is not served by such action.
The Whittaker case"7 serves to illustrate again the somewhat unique
position occupied by creditors and stockholders in receivership or bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Because they are supposedly represented already in
the proceedings, their entrance may be dependent upon a showing of
inadequate representation. In the Forbes case it was held that in a re-
ceivership of a corporation obtained at the suit of a stockholder, other
stockholders might not intervene in order to file a cross bill to have the
receiver's sale suspended. It had not been shown that there was "col-
lusion or fraud" in the institution of the proceedings. Representation
was supposedly adequate because the court was "satisfied that the charges
of fraud and collusion made against the receiver are entirely ground-
84. Mueller v. Adler, 292 Fed. 138 (C. C.A. 8th, 1923); Adler v. Seaman, 265
Fed. 828 (C. C.A. 8th, 1920).
85. First Trust Co. v. Illinois Central R.IL, 252 Fed. 965 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918),
cert. denied, 249 U. S. 615. But see Couch et a. v. Central Bank and Trust Corp., 297
Fed. 216 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924). See Burrow v. Citizens' State Bank, 74 F. (2d) 929
(C. C. A. 5th, 1935). Suit was brought by a bank to recover from an insurance company
for losses sustained by the bank personally and as bailee. The coverage of the policies
was limited, and insufficient, if the bank's own claim was as large as alleged, to cover
fully the loss of'the bailors. The bailors sought to intervene to contest the amount of
the bailee's own claim. While the subordination rule was not mentioned, the denial
of intervention seems to carry with it a trace of that rule. And see also Baxter v.
McGee, 82 F. (2d) 695 (C. C.A. 8th, 1936).
86. 252 Fed. 965, 968 (1918).
87. 43 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930); cf. Zeitinger v. Hargardine McKittrid:
Dry Goods Co., 244 Fed. 719 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917) ; In re Beaver Cotton Mil1, 275 Fed.
498 (D. C. N. D. Ga. 1921).
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less." ' a The difficulty could be avoided by a frank recognition that
stockholders and creditors at the present time are not adequately repre-
sented in such proceedings and should therefore be granted an absolute
right to intervene.
PRIOR DECREES
Closely connected with the idea of subordination, and indeed often
treated as though it were a part of .that principle, is the general and well
settled rule, stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis to be "that intervention will
not be allowed for the purpose of impeaching a decree already made." '
Consent decrees and administrative orders are, therefore, not ordinarily
subject to attack.ssa This general intervention rule is based upon the
same policy underlying the general rule of finality of orders and judg-
ments between original parties. And just as there are exceptions to the
latter rule, so are there exceptions to the general intervention rule. Rarely,
however, should administrative orders and decrees entered prior to inter-
vention be set aside at the intervener's behest. Nor should other orders
and decrees be set aside unless a clear case is made out that such prior
order or decree would deprive the intervener of substantial rights which
he has not been remiss in pressing. The fact that the petitioner has an
absolute right to intervene will not in itself be a basis for the avoidance
87a. 9 Fed. Cas. 408, 413 (C. C. W. D. Tex. 1872). See In re Babcock, 26 F. (2d)
153 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928) (where quasi parties allowed discretionary intervention, it may
be specially limited). See also Toledo, St. L. & K. C. Ry. v. Continental Trust, 95 Fed.
497 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899).
88. United States v. California Coop. Canneries, 279 U. S. 553, 556 (1929). But
note in St. Louis & S. F. R.R. v. Spiller, 274 U. S. 304 (1927) where a creditor of
a corporation had failed to file his claim in the reorganization proceedings. The final
decree as interpreted by the Supreme Court did not provide for his participation. Never-
theless, he was allowed to file his claim at a later date. There was "no good reason,"
Mr. Justice Brandeis stated, "why relief may not be had as well upon intervening
petition as upon an original bill." Cf. Wenborne-Karpen Dryer Co. v. Dort Motor Car
Co., 14 F. (2d) 378 (C. C.A. 6th, 1926).
88a. The rule has been carried to dubious lengths in Keller v. Wilson, 194 Atl. 45
(Del. 1937) where intervention after a settlement but before a motion to dismiss was
said to come too late. Cf. Tretolite Co. v. Darby Petroleum Corp., 5 F. Supp. 445
(N. D. Okla. 1934), where the court indicated that an intervener with an absolute
right would not be barred by consent decree. In Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co.
v. Duluth & W. R. Co., 70 Fed. 803 (D. Minn. 5th, 1895) intervention was allowed
stockholders after a consent decree.
Cf. Foote v. Parsons Non-Skid Co., 196 Fed. 951 (C. C.A. 6th, 1912), and United
States v. Columbia River Packers Ass'n, 11 F. Supp. 675 (D. C. Ore. 1935). In both
of these cases intervention was thought discretionary and was denied on the subordination
issue. In the latter case, the appellate court held intervention to be of right, and held
it error to deny intervention because of the subordination rule. United States v.
Columbia River Packers Ass'n, 81 F. (2d) 421 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
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of this rule. It should be pointed out that the rule as to prior decrees
does not regulate the right of the petitioner to intervene, but nevertheless
where the right to intervene is discretionary, one factor in denying
intervention will be the administrative inconvenience that intervention
might cause, or the fact that intervention for the sole purpose of attacking
a prior decree would be useless."9 Where the right to intervene is abso-
lute, however, it is particularly important that the problems be kept
separate. In Ex parte Jordan, where bondholders desired to intervene
and to object to certain prior orders and final decrees rendered prior to
their admission in the proceeding, the Supreme Court in allowing inter-
vention distinguished between the right to intervene and the possibility
of contesting the prior orders and decrees. "When the case gets here
the petitioners may not be allowed to go behind orders actually made
by the court as to the administration of the property before they were
permitted to defend." 90
The rule as to prior decrees shades off into a general rule that the
late intervener who has been guilty of what might be termed laches will
not be allowed to cause undue administrative inconvenience which would
have been avoided but for his delay. It is well to remember, however,
that the fact that intervention is sought at a late date in the proceedings
does not necessarily mean that prior orders will be questioned nor that
there will be administrative difficulties. Thus in the receivership of the
First Federal Trust Co. v. First National Bank of San Francisco,2' credi-
tors were permitted intervention to ask for immediate sale and liquida-
tion, despite the lapse of four years, since the court felt that inter-
vention made for no administrative difficulties. It seems particularly
important that the question of laches or lateness in intervening should
not be treated in the first instance as controlling the right of the inter-
venor to come into the proceedings, but rather should be considered at
a later time when the intervener's claim or defense is considered on the
merits. Where a purchaser at a foreclosure sale sought to intervene two
years later in the proceedings and reject a contract which ran with the
purchase, Chief Justice Taft commented: "It may be that equity will
not give it (the purchaser) relief from mistake under the circumstances.
It may be that it has acquiesced and may be denied relief on that account.
89. Rheinberger v. Security Life Ins. Co. of America, 72 F. (2d) 147 (C. C.A.
7th, 1934).
90. 94 U. S. 248, at 252 (1876). The interveners had been "defendants and actors"
in a reference before a master, although "it is true that the petitioners were not parties
to the suit until after the bill was taken as confessed.
91. 297 Fed. 353 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924). The trial court had also denied the right
of trustees under a deed of trust to intervene. The trustees would seem to have had
an absolute right to intervene based on an interest in property in the custody of the
court, and the appellate court considered the trustees' claims on their merits. Cf.
Hutchison v. Philadelphia & G. S. S. Co., 216 Fed. 795 (E. D. Pa. 1914).
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It may be that it has been guilty of laches. But these are questions on
the merits." 92
Many examples can be given of the operation of the rule under con-
sideration as a limitation upon the status of the intervener. In Harris
Trust & Savings Bank v. Chicago Rys. Co.,93 the rule as to prior decrees
was one ground for denying the contention of interveners that the amount
paid by the receiver of the Chicago Railways to the City of Chicago was
improper. In Lincoln Printing Co. v. Middle West Utilities Co.,94 it was
said that the intervening owner of stock could not question the original
appointment of the receiver, although he could question the present in-
eligibility of the receiver. Where the court has appointed a receiver
on condition that certain claims be prior to the claims under the 'mort-
gage, bondholders who intervene are bound by the previous consent of
the trustee to the order.95 It has been held that interveners may not
question a prior decree of sale,9" nor may they have a receivership con-
tinued when prior to their intervention it was held to be improper. T
One court has allowed intervention on the express provision that evi-
92. Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railroad Co. v. Indianapolis Union Ry.,
270 U. S. 107, 116 (1926). See Ex parte Jordan, 94 U. S. 248 (1876) (bondholders
permitted to intervene after a pro confesso order); French v. Gapen, 105 U. S. 509
(1881) (intervention after decree of sale.) Cf. United States v. Safe Deposit Co. of
New York, 15 F. Supp. 1080 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
The holding in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry.,
[52 F. (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931)] seems open to criticism on this point. Here
intervention was denied to a bondholders' committee because the bondholders were
sufficiently well represented by the trustee and also because the committee did not attempt
to assert its claim of the invalidity of the pledge of bonds to the United States until
six years after the receivership began and after final decree of foreclosure and sale.
The court brushed aside the argument of the committee that not until the end of the
six year period had it discovered the facts upon which it based its claim because "the
mere failure and neglect of the committee to employ counsel until after final decree
has been entered furnishes no excuse for its negligence and delay in seeking to protect
its alleged rights." Id., at 422. The court nevertheless recognized the rule that inter-
vention is a matter of right "where the petitioner, not being already fairly represented,
is asserting a right which could be lost or substantially affected if intervention were
denied." Where the original proceeding was filed as a class action, a later petitioning
intervener will not be guilty of laches if his claims have been put forward in the class
action. But he may find himself barred by laches from reopening matters finally litigated.
Bankers' Trust Co. v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 273 Fed. 999 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921);
cf. Pillinger v. Beaty, 265 Fed. 551 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920).
93. 39 F. (2d) 958 (N. D. Ill. 1929).
94. 74 F. (2d) 779 (C.C.A. 7th, 1935).
95. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kansas City W. & N. W. Ry., 53 Fed. 182
(C. C. Kan. 1892). The court vacated the order making the bondholders parties, but that
seems to have been unnecessary.
96. King v. Barr, 262 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920), cert. denied, 253 U. S. 484
(1919).
97. Brictson Mfg. v. Woodrough, 284 Fed. 484 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
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dence already taken in the original suit insofar as it bears upon the inter-
vener's case should be considered as taken subject to the intervener's
right to recall and examine the witnesses.03
The Right of the Intervener to Cout crclaim, Cross-claim, and to
Bring in Third Parties. The right of an intervener to press an affirma-
tive claim against the plaintiff goes to the very heart of the intervener's
status. It cannot be said that the status of the intervener in this regard
has been finally settled. The problem may be more dearly stated in
terms of six questions: (1) may the intervener offer as a counterclaim
a counterclaim open to the original defendant; (2) may the intervener
offer as a counterclaim one not open to the original defendant; (3) may
the intervener add new parties to the proceedings; (4) may the inter-
vener add to the proceedings new parties who do not have the requisite
diversity of citizenship when the basis of federal jurisdiction over the
main proceeding is diversity of citizenship; (5) may the plaintiff inter-
pose the defense of improper venue to the intervener's counterclaim,
even though the plaintiff would be said to have waived that defense as
against an original defendant; (6) may an original party counterclaim
against the intervener. There has been a great deal of litigation on these
issues in recent years, particularly with respect to patent infringement
and unfair competition, and while it is impossible to answer the questions
with certainty, the trend of the cases is fairly clear.
At the outset it must be again indicated that the desire of the petitioner
to present a counterclaim or to add new parties may be one reason for
denying intervention for these purposes, if the right to intervene is only
discretionary. The fact that the intervener's "position is essentially ag-
gressive," as was stated in Coffin v. Chattanooga Water and Power
Co.,9 has been posited as a ground for denying intervention. The addi-
tion of new issues and new parties under certain circumstances may be
considered contrary'to orderly procedure-300 Under the procedure adopted
by the new Rules the court will be able to determine before intervention
is allowed, subject, of course, to its power to permit amendments, whether
the intervener proposes to counterclaim or add new parties, and it may
then determine the scope of the intervention which it wishes to allow.")'
98. Mathieson v. Craven, 247 Fed. 223 (Del. 1917). "The propriety of a special
order in a court of equity for the reading and consideration of such evidence in favor
of subsequent interveners as against those who have had full opportunity to eamine
and cross-examine witnesses and adduce or oppose the introduction of documentary
evidence is well settled." Id., at 22&
99. 44 Fed. 533 (S. D. Tenn. 1891).
I00. See Curan and Others v. St. Charles Car Co., 32 Fed. 835 (E. D. Mo. 1837);
Atlas Underwear Co. v. Cooper Underwear Co., 210 Fed. 347 (E. D. Wis. 1913).
101. Rule 24: "The motion . . .shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth
the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." See Chandler & Price v. Brandtjen
& Kluge, 296 U. S. 53 (1935).
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If general intervention has been allowed, however, it is reasonably clear
that the intervener has the same right to counterclaim or cross-claim as an
original party. In the field of intervention it is to be regretted that in
the past petitioners have often failed to file proposed pleadings with their
petitions; if they had done so, it is probable that the rules concerning
counterclaims and third parties would be less strict. The Federal Rules,
as pointed out above, have clarified this problem in the direction of
freedom to counterclaim and cross-claim.
Up to the present the intervener's right to counterclaim was dependent
on a construction of Equity Rule 30, which provides for answers and
counterclaims in general. The rule states that "The answer must state
in short and simple form any counterclaim arising out of the transac-
tion which is the subject matter of the suit, and may, without cross
bill, set up any set-off or counterclaim against the plaintiff which may
be the subject of an independent suit in equity against him . . "102
The difficulty, however, is that Equity Rule 30 previously states that
"The defendant by his answer shall set out in short and simple terms
his defense." This made it possible to argue that Rule 30 was only
applicable to original defendants and not to interveners, even though the
interveners came in as defendants.
Equity Rule 30 has generally been applied, however, to permit an
intervener to counterclaim only when the particular counterclaim was
one open to the original defendant.103  But cases so holding were all
cases in which the right to intervene was only discretionary, 10 4 and there-
fore it is possible to argue that if the intervener had had an absolute
right to intervene, his status would not have been so limited.10 5 Where
the intervener has an absolute right, and his intervention is as a party
plaintiff, as is so often the case, it would seem that he might bring in
third parties, and interject claims based upon his absolute right, which
are not open to any of the other parties. This might well be the case
even if his intervention were as a party defendant. The right to bring
102. Uniform Equity Rules of 1912 as amended May 4, 1925; Horxins, FEDERAL
EQUrrY RuLEs (8th ed. 1933) 209. See generally, Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Juris-
dictional Limitations on Federal Procedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 393.
103. United States Expansion Bolt Co. v. Kroncke Hardware Co., 234 Fed. 868
(C. C. A. 7th, 1916) did allow an intervener to counterclaim when the particular
counterclaim was not one open to the original defendant, but the United States Expansion
Bolt Co. case has been overruled -to that extent. See note 118, infra.
104. This is true because most of the cases involve patent infringements, and the
manufacturer has only a discretionary right to intervene in a suit for patent infringe-
ment against his vendee. Demulso Corp. v. Tretolite Co., 74 F. (2d) 805 (C. C. A.
10th, 1934). See Moore and Levi, supra note 1, at 585.
105. See Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U. S. 222 (1935), discussed in! ra, p. 925;
Compton v. Jesup, 68 Fed. 293 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v.
Byrnes, 24 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
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in third parties was, of course, limited with the right to counterclaim.
Apparently an intervener with only a discretionary right could not bring
in third parties with respect to his counterclaim if the original party
with whom he was aligned could not have done so relative to that counter-
claim."0 6 If the intervener with a discretionary right may bring in
third parties, and if the citizenship of the third parties is material, as
in diversity of citizenship, it would seem the third parties may not be
added to the suit when the effect would be to oust the court of juris-
diction over the counterclaim. 10 7 If those third parties are indispensable,
the counterclaim may not be adjudicated. The argument could be made
that an intervener with an absolute right to intervene would not have
been so limited, and that, further, in adding new parties, the intervener
having an absolute right would not have to show independent jurisdic-
tional grounds' 0
The historical development of the above rules on counterclaims can
be traced through the following cases. The earliest case on the point
appears to have been Curran v. St. Charles Car Co.,103 where the man-
ufacturer of an apparatus which allegedly infringed the plaintiff's patent
sought intervention in a suit against his customer. The petition of the
manufacturer seemed to the court to be a "reasonable request," and
accordingly was allowed. The manufacturer, however, then presented
106. Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kiuge, Inc., 296 U. S. 53 (1935) ; Magnolia
Petroleum Products Co. v. Suits, 40 F. (2d) 161 (C. C.A. 10th, 1930); see Hairgrove
v. City of Jacksonville, 8 N. E. (2d) 187 (Ill. 1937).
107. Fulton Nat. Bank of Atlanta v. Hozier, 267 U. S. 276 (1925).
108. Compton v. Jesup, 68 Fed. 263 (C. C.A. 6th, 1S95); St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. v. Byrnes, 24 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). See Powell v. United States, 57
Sup. Ct. 470 (1937), where even though the right to intervene 'was absolute in a suit
to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, it was held that inter-
vention might not be for the purpose of a counterclaim "that does not arise out of the
transaction that is the subject of the suit and is not germane or related to it" and is
not ordinarily triable by a three judge court. The original action was to set aside an
order of the Commission ordering that a Tariff be "stricken from the files:' The inter-
vener claimed that the tariff should be stricken since the operation for which the tariff
was filed came under Section 1(18) as to the operation of an extension of a railroad
without a certificate of public convenience. The concept "transaction germane to the
suit" would seem to be sufficiently broad to cover the counterclaim, although the argu-
ment based on the special nature of the main proceeding (one before a three judge
court) seems more cogent. The limitation that the counterclaim be one arising out of
the transaction where there is no independent federal jurisdictional ground for the
counterclaim is applicable to original defendants as well as interveners. See Moore v.
N. Y. Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593 (1926); Shulman and Jaegerman, .supra note
102 at 410. Where the plaintiff in the original action brings an ancillary bill against
a stranger .claiming an interest in the res, this suit may be brought without regard to
the separate federal jurisdictional requirements for the ancillary bill. Central Union
Trust Co. of New York v. Anderson County, 268 U. S. 93 (1925).
109. 32 Fed. 835 (E. D. Mo. 1887).
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a counterclaim against the complainants asking that they be restrained
from threatening other customers and from bringing other suits against
licensees of vendees of the manufacturer. This counterclaim was one
which was not open to the original defendant inasmuch as it .was the
vendee of only one machine. The court felt that it "ought not permit
a third party to come in as a defendant and then file a cross-bill which
the original defendant could not maintain,"' 110 and denied the counter-
claim. At that date it was not clear that the intervener could counter-
claim even if the counterclaim offered was one open to the original
defendant. Thus in Atlas Underwear Co. v. Cooper Underwear Co.,111
intervention was refused when the intervener desired to counterclaim
against the plaintiff for patent infringement and to add a new party.
The court was not sure that this counterclaim would not have been
allowed the original defendant, but it felt that the intervener's interest
was insufficient to justify burdening the proceedings with new parties.
Later, in the Allington case, 1 2 the court was willing to concede that
"the right of an intervening party defendant with respect to setting up
counterclaims is, under Equity Rule 30, as broad as that of an original
party defendant." Nevertheless, it felt that the right must be limited to
those which the original defendant could exercise.
"To permit over the objections of the plaintiff, a person to inter-
vene not pro interesse suo only, but as a party defendant, and then
to permit such intervening party defendant to set up against the
plaintiff a counterclaim for affirmative relief that is not available
to the original defendant, and to which the original defendant is
not entitled, would be conferring upon such third persons broad
rights, indeed, with respect to litigation, and might be extending
the rights of third persons beyond the point intended by Equity
Rules 30 and 37."113
It was inevitable that cases involving the right of the intervener to
counterclaim should eventually involve the problem of venue. Since
most of the cases involved claims for patent infringements, Section 48
of the judicial Code was applicable.114 It states:
"In suits brought on the infringement of letters patent, the district
court . . . shall have jurisdiction, in law or in equity, in the district
of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which
110. Id., at 837.
111. 210 Fed. 347 (E. D. Wis. 1913).
112. Allington v. Shevlon-Hixon Co., 2 F. (2d) 747 (D. Del. 1924) (the plaintiff
had moved to dismiss.)
113. 2 F. (2d) 747, 749 (D. Del. 1924).
114. 28 U. S. C. A. §109.
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the defendant . . . shall have committed acts of infringement and
have a regular and established place of business."
If the plaintiff in the original proceeding is not an inhabitant of the
district and has not committed acts of infringement in the district, then
the intervener will be unable to counterclaim against him for patent
infringement unless it can be said that the plaintiff by bringing the
proceedings has waived his rights under Section 48.'" If there is an
absolute right to intervene, the intervener should be able to litigate the
claim or defense for which he intervenes in all its ramifications, even
though counterclaims or cross-claims are involved therein. This is so
because the court's processes are being used to his prejudice. It would
follow that no one could object to the presentation of his claim on the
ground of improper. venue if the presentation of his claim would have
been allowed on other grounds. The United States Expansion Bolt case,"'
coming at a time when it was not clear as to whether, or to what extent,
the intervener could counterclaim under Equity Rule 30, and involving
in addition the question of waiver of venue, was something of a land-
mark in the development of the status of the intervener on these points.
In the United States Expansion Bolt case, the Hardware Company
was sued for its use of certain diamond screw anchors which were
alleged to infringe the patent of the plaintiff. The Diamond Expansion
Bolt Company, the manufacturer of these diamond screw anchors, inter-
vened and proceeded to counterclaim for the infringement by the plaintiff
of two other patents for an expansion shield and an expansion bolt,
and in addition, it set up a claim for acts of unfair competition. The
plaintiff was a citizen of New York; the suit was in Wisconsin, and
the venue was incorrect for the counterclaim unless there could be said
to have been a waiver. Furthermore, it was clear that the original de-
fendant could not have counterclaimed on the two other patents. Finally,
while the basis of federal jurisdiction was present for matters involving
patent infringements, there was no independent jurisdiction for the
claim of unfair competition, and there was no diversity between the
plaintiff and the intervener. The circuit court of appeals said that the
115. Leman v. Krentler Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U. S. 448 (1932); cf. Ale.'%nnder
v. Hillman, 296 U. S. 222 (1935); General Electric Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co.,
287 U. S. 430 (1932); see First National Bank of Charlotte v. Morgan, 132 U. S. 141
(1889).
The failure of the Supreme Court to discuss waiver of venue in Chandler & Price
Co. v. Brandtjen & Kiuge, Inc., 296 U. S. 53 (1935) when that issue had been stressed
by judge Hand in the circuit court, 75 F. (2d) 472, is some evidence that if the require-
ments of the Chandler case are followed, the intervener will not be given an additional
hurdle as to venue. See also United States Expansion Bolt Co. v. Kroncke Hardware
CO., 234 Fed. 868 (C. C. A. 7th, 1910).
116. 234 Fed. 868 (C. C.A. 7th, 1916).
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plaintiff's act of bringing suit in Wisconsin constituted a waiver as to
counterclaims by an intervener based on patent infringements; it ap-
parently disregarded any limitation as to the intervener's right to counter-
claim based on an inability of the original defendant to counterclaim.
It held that the claim of unfair competition could not be litigated because
of a lack of federal jurisdiction.11 The Expansion Bolt case, then, would
seem to have indicated that the intervener came under the provisions
of Equity Rule 30 without limitation, that venue waived as to the
defendant would be waived as to the intervener, and that, by analogy
at least, if new parties were brought in by an intervener who lacked an
absolute right to intervene, there would have to be some independent
federal jurisdictional grounds .to support the claim against them. But
the circuit court was probably incorrect in the Expansion Bolt case in
its liberal interpretation of the right of the intervener to counterclaim. 118
Finally in 1935 in Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtien & Kluge,"9
the Supreme Court disapproved the doctrine of the Expansion Bolt case
insofar as it allowed the intervener to counterclaim when the defendant
had no interest in that particular counterclaim. 20 The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit had held that the intervening manufac-
turer might not counterclaim for patent infringement.12' Judge Learned
Hand gave as the reason for this prohibition the fact that the venue
was incorrect as to the plaintiff; that while the venue had been waived
by the plaintiff who chose his adversary knowing "what other disputes
are pending between him and the defendant, and by selecting him for
attack may be charged with the risk of meeting a reprisal," the venue
117. The court was probably wrong on the federal jurisdiction point. It distinguished
Payson Mfg. Co. v. Ludwigs, 206 Fed. 60 (C. C.A. 7th, 1913) on the aggravation
point. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933); Comment (1934) 1 U. OF Cux.
L. Rxv. 480; (1933) 46 H.Av. L. Ray. 1339; 32 MICH. L. REV. 412; cf. Geneva Furni-
ture Co. v. Karpen, 238 U. S. 254 (1915).
118. "The decisions of the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States Expansion Bolt Co. v. Kroncke Hardware Co. . . . are disapproved to the
extent, if at all, that they tend to support intervener's contention that it is entitled to
set up the counterclaim." Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen and Kluge, Inc., 296
U. S. 53, 58 (1935). But see Leaver v. K. & L. Box & Lumber Co., 6 F. (2d) 666
(N. D. Cal. 1925) where it was held that the manufacturer intervening in a patent
infringement case may not counterclaim for damages against the plaintiff on the ground
of the plaintiff's threats against its customer and interference with its business. The
court pointed out that Equity Rule 30 which allows the defendant to counterclaim does
not expressly include an intervener. It felt that the intervener's "range of activity
. . . in the prosecution or defense of the interest he is there permitted to assert must
necessarily be as extensive but no greater than that allowed the original parties to
the suit." Cf. Texas Co. v. Borne Scrymser Co., 68 F. (2d) 104 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
119. 296 U. S. 53 (1935).
120. See note 118, supra.
121. 75 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). The Circuit Court admitted that the inter-
vener as an original defendant could have so counterclaimed.
[Vol. 47: 898
FEDERAL INTERVENTION: II
was not waived as to an intervener, for "the plaintiff has not chosen
him as an antagonist."'1 22 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, in
affirming the decision of the Circuit Court, did so, not on the grounds
that the venue was incorrect, but on the grounds that "there is no sug-
gestion that defendant has any interest in the countercaim." L* The
court construed Equity Rule 30 as not applicable to an intervener. "But
the context makes against construing the word 'defendant' as used in
the rule to include one permitted to intervene."' 24 If this statement were
taken literally, it would be impossible for an intervener to counterclaim
at all, except by implication under Rule 37, or under the general equit-
able power of a court to do complete justice. This general equitable
power has since been recognized to permit an original party to counter-
claim against an intervener on a claim related to the intervener's claim.'
The intervener there may not object successfully on the grounds of im-
proper venue. 26
The Federal Rules have, however, resolved much of the above con-
fusion, provided Rule 13 on Counterclaim and Cross-Claim is given a
fair, literal interpretation. That rule is applicable to all parties, whether
original, intervening, or otherwise; it distinguished between compulsory
and permissive counterclaims. A compulsory counterclaim is one which
in general arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim. Where the counterclaim is com-
pulsory, it must be pleaded or it will be barred.
Under subdivision (h) "when the presence of parties other than those
to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in
the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order
them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules." Neither
the counterclaim nor the bringing in of third parties is restricted to claims
which would have been allowed an original party. The intervener with
an absolute right therefore seems only restricted by requirements of
jurisdiction or venue in the same manner as an original party. The dis-
cretionary intervener under a liberal interpretation will also be allowed
to counterclaim and to bring in third parties, although it is possible that
jurisdictional and venue requirements may be more strict in his case.
On the other hand, the desire of an intervener with only a discretionary
right to counterclaim or bring in third parties is of importance in de-
termining whether his intervention will unduly burden the proceedings.
The requirement that the motion to intervene shall be accompanied by a
122. Id., at 473.
123. 296 U. S. 53, 57 (1935).
124. Id., at 58, 59.
125. Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U. S. 222 (1935).
126. See Rice v. Durham Water Co., 91 Fed. 433, 434 (E. D. N. C. 1899).
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proposed pleading will make it possible for the court to decide at that
time whether a proposed counterclaim will unduly burden the proceedings,
and it may deny or restrict intervention on that account.
Future Orders. The statement has been made that once intervention
has been allowed the intervener is a party for all purposes. This state-
ment was certainly too broad under intervention practice prior to the
Federal Rules, and under the Rules the court should have the power to
limit intervention to certain claims or defenses. The statement is, never-
theless, applicable to orders issued in the proceeding after there has been
intervention. The intervener is bound by future orders, unless the inter-
vention has been specially limited. In that restricted case only orders
pertaining to the matter for which intervention was permitted would be
binding on him. The intervener will therefore have to appeal appealable
orders or decrees, or be bound by them, and he cannot merely amend
his petition of intervention to ask for additional relief. 127 In submitting
himself to the jurisdiction of the federal court, the intervener also makes
himself vulnerable to a complete adjudication by the federal court of
the issues in litigation between the intervener and the adverse party.
Thus in Rice v. Durham Water Co., 2 " the intervener asked that the re-
ceiver of the Water Company be temporarily restrained from cutting
off the water supply. The receiver then asked that a suit pending against
the Water Company by the intervener in the state court be removed
to and consolidated with the action in the federal court. This was granted,
even though that suit did not involve any federal jurisdictional grounds.
III. FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
When original federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship,
there must be diversity between the parties plaintiff on one side and de-
fendant on the other, as realigned by the court when necessary. 129 If the
party lacking the requisite diversity is an indispensable party to the pro-
ceeding, the federal court will lose jurisdiction over the entire proceed-
ing.13° On the other hand, if the party lacking the requisite diversity is
only a necessary and not an indispensable party, the suit may proceed in
the federal court without the presence of that party.31 ' The widespread
127. Commercial Electrical Supply Co. v. Curtis, 288 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923),
cert. denied, 263 U. S. 709.
128. 91 Fed. 433 (E. D. N. C. 1899); see also Boston Acme Mines Corp. v. Salina
Canyon Coal Co., 3 F. (2d) 729 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) (intervention in state court
proceedings, later federal court proceedings should be stayed).
129. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, et aL, 3 Cranch (U. S.) 267 (1806) ; Blake v. McKim,
103 U. S. 336 (1880) ; see Fosm, FEDmAL. PRAcTiCE (1920) § 41.
130. Patterson v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 251 Fed. 255 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918).
131. Beebe v. Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry., 39 Fed. 481 (N. D., Miss. 1889); Barnes
& Co. v. Berry, 156 Fed. 72 (S. D. Ohio, 1907). See Sioux City T. R. & W. Co.
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practice of allowing intervention in federal proceedings, however, tends
to modify these rules in practice where the foundation of jurisdiction
is diversity of citizenship. A single case may serve to illustrate the diffi-
culty. In Drimright v. Texas Sugarlad Co.,132 both the mortgagee and
the former equitable owner sued the purchasers of the property for
foreclosure of the mortgage declaration and enforcement of an equitable
lien, or rescission. Since the federal jurisdiction was founded on diver-
sity, it was necessary that there be complete diversity between the equity
owner and mortgagee on the one hand and the purchasers of the property
on the other. The former equity owner, however, had the same citizen-
ship as one of the defendants, and the action, as brought, could not be
maintained. Inasmuch as the equity owner was not an indispensable
party, he was dismissed from the suit as a party plaintiff, and the bill
was maintained without him. Up to this point the ordinary rules of
federal jurisdiction had been followed. The equity owner, however,
then proceeded to file a petition of intervention, and this was allowed.
Thus through the roundabout method of intervention, a necessary party,
lacking the requisite diversity, was allowed to become a party to a pro-
ceeding from which he had been dismissed.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not deal with the question
of what federal jurisdictional requirements are necessary for an inter-
vener. But on the basis of the distinction already applied in other in-
stances between the absolute and discretionary rights to intervene, it is
possible to state a rule which is in accordance with most of the cases.
That rule, as above indicated, is that intervention under an absolute
right or under a discretionary right in an in rem proceeding, need not
be supported by grounds of jurisdiction independent of those supporting
the original action. Intervention in an in persoiiam action under a dis-
cretionary right must be supported by independent grounds of jurisdiction.
The above rule protects the intervener (1) who has an unconditional,
federal statutory right to intervene, or (2) whose interest is so affected
by inadequate representation, or by distribution or other disposition of
property subject to court control, that he has an absolute right to inter-
vene. It is flexible enough so that a court may, in its discretion, permit
intervention when a federal statute confers only a conditional right, or
when convenience warrants the court to adjudicate claims or defenses
of the intervener relative to property in the custody of the court, although
the intervener cannot show that he has an absolute right. In those cases
no independent federal grounds of jurisdiction are necessary, and the
rule is in accordance with the general theory that in such situations
v. Trust Co., 82 Fed. 124 (C. C.A. 8th, 1897), which is similar to Drumright v.
Texas Sugarland Co., 16 F. (2d) 657 (C. C.A. 5th, 1927).
132. Drumright v. Texas Sugarland Co., 16 F. (Zd) 657 (C. C. A. Sth, 1927).
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intervention is ancillary to the main proceeding. On the other hand, by
requiring a showing that there would have been federal jurisdiction
had he been joined as an original plaintiff or defendant, it protects the
jurisdiction of the federal courts from undue expansion in the case where
the intervener is admitted solely because he had a claim or defense that
presents a question of law or fact common to the pending litigation.
Thus if it is assumed in the Drunright case that the equity owner
had an absolute right of intervention, the case was handled correctly."'
If, on the other hand, he was allowed to intervene merely because his
claim presented a question of law or fact common to the main litigation
the case is subject to criticism. It would not seem justifiable to allow dis-
cretionary intervention to do indirectly what cannot be done directly
by original joinder in an in persoham action.
There are cases which seem contrary to the rule stated above. The
case of Cochrane v. Potts 3 may be thought to hold that even where
the right to intervene is absolute, there must be independent jurisdic-
tional grounds to support the intervention. Here original proceedings
had been begun by the holder of securities of only one of six separate
bond issues, and a receiver asked for. One Kegerries, a holder of one
of the other issues, intervened. The federal court appointed a receiver
for securities of all the issues despite the lack of any interest of the
original plaintiff in the collateral of the other issues, other than the
interest of a general creditor. A trustee appointed by the state court to
take charge of collateral underlying issues not held by the original peti-
tioner intervened to demand such collateral. On appeal, Judge Hutcheson
declared the jurisdiction of the federal court over the collateral, which
did not underlie the issue held by the original petitioner, to be void, and,
as to the intervention of Kegerries, held that inasmuch as there was not
the requisite diversity between Kegerries and the defendants, there was
likewise no jurisdiction over the collateral of the issue held by Kegerries.
If it be assumed that the court had jurisdiction over the res, which in
this case would be the collateral underlying the Kegerries' issue, then the
refusal to sustain jurisdiction over the claim of Kegerries would be a
holding that independent jurisdictional grounds, such as diversity, would
be required from an intervener having an absolute right to intervene.
The case, however, is distinguishable. Judge Hutcheson's decision was
133. Under the broad construction given to the requirement that there be a lien
or ownership as to property in order that the right to intervene be absolute in some
cases, the intervener in the Drumright case might well have had an absolute right to
intervene. See in particular, Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. American Surety Co.
of New York, 64 F. (2d) 577 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933); Tift v. Southern Ry., 159 Fed.
555 (S. D. Ga. 1908). Cf. Bickford v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 5 F. Supp.
875 (S. D. N. Y. 1933). The theory of this case that a common question of law or
fact does not warrant intervention is, of course, no longer sound under Rule 24(b).
134. Cochrane v. Potts Son & Co., 47 F. (2d) 1027 (C. C.A. 5th, 1931).
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rather based on the holding that the court lacked jurisdiction of the res
(collateral underlying issues not held by the original plaintiff) prior to
the entrance of Kegerries into the suit. In this respect the decision may
be criticized, for the interest of a general creditor, such as the plaintiff
who was both a lien and general creditor, might well suffice to give the
court jurisdiction over all collateral. But if it is assumed there was no
jurisdiction over the collateral in question, the entrance of Kegerries
would not confer it. The case merely holds that an intervener cannot
confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Some cases seem to hold that a creditor having only a discretionary
right to intervene need not show any independent jurisdictional grounds.
These cases also may be distinguished. In Wficlita R.R. v. Public Utility
Commission, 3s a utility company, having only a discretionary right,
intervened in a suit by its purchaser to restrain the public service com-
mission from raising rates. Chief Justice Taft held that this inter-
vention did not defeat the jurisdiction of the federal court, even though
the basis of jurisdiction was diversity and though there was no diversity
between the intervener and the purchaser. But the intervening utility
was not an indispensable party, and therefore there would be no reason
for the court to lose jurisdiction over the entire proceedings. The Chief
Justice did not hold that there was jurisdiction over the intervener's
answer to the bill. 36 The Sixth Circuit in Vogue Co. v. Vogue Hat
Co." 7 held that a decree of the court as to unfair competition would be
binding on an intervening defendant in a patent infringement case, al-
though there was no diversity between the intervener and plaintiff. But
the claim for patent infringement and unfair competition constituted but
one cause of action, and hence federal jurisdiction based on the daim
for patent infringement supported the claim for unfair competition. The
most troublesome case is In re Metropolitan Ry. Rece, ership. s There
the lessor of the railway was allowed to intervene and have the receiver-
ship extended to it. Diversity was lacking between the intervener and
the railway, but not between the complainant and the intervener. If it
is assumed that the lessor intervened as a party defendant, the case
raises no special problem. If the lessor intervened as a party plaintiff,
then it is necessary to assume, unless the case is contrary to our rule,
that the lessor had an absolute right to intervene - which was apparently
not the theory of the case."'u
135. 260 U. S. 48 (1922).
136. The contention was made that the original "bill should have been, and must
be now, dismissed for want of jurisdiction and uithout any inquiry into the other imsues
of law and fact." Id., at 53.
137. The Vogue Co. v. Vogue Hat Co., 12 F. (2d) 991 (C C. A. 6th, 1926).
138. 208 U. S. 90 (1908).
139. See Moore and Levi, supra note 1, at 584. An argument which would justify
intervention in this situation without independent grounds of jurisdiction to support it
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While it may be admitted then that there are some cases which might
seem contrary to the rule as we have stated it-although we believe these
cases on closer examination are reconcilable with that rule, most cases
affirm the doctrine that an intervener with an absolute right need not
show independent jurisdictional grounds, and that an intervener with
only a discretionary right must do so. The doctrine that an intervener
with an absolute right need not show independent jurisdictional grounds
finds early recognition in the cases. In Freeman v. Howe, 4 " mortgagees,
who had unsuccessfully attempted to replevy goods in the custody of
the federal court by a state court writ, claimed that they were left with-
out a remedy, since the federal court had custody through an attach-
ment suit and the mortgagees had the same citizenship as the defendant
in that suit. To that contention the court responded:
"those familiar with the practice of the federal courts have found
no difficulty in applying a remedy, and one much more effectual
than the replevin, and more consistent with the order and harmony
of judicial proceedings. The principle is, that the bill filed on the
equity side of the court to restrain or regulate judgments or suits
at law in the same court, and thereby prevent injustice, is not an
original suit, but ancillary and dependent, supplementary merely to
the original suit, out of which it had arisen, and is maintained with-
out reference to the citizenship or residence of the parties."'141
Krippendorf v. Hyde,42 one of the earliest cases to establish clearly
the absolute right to intervene when there was an interest in a fund in
court, involved intervention by a petitioner who did not show that there
was any independent jurisdictional ground for his claim. The court
found this to be no defect. "The question of citizenship, which might
become material as an element of jurisdiction in a court of the United
States when the proceeding is pending in it, is obviated by treating the
intervention of the strangers to the action in his own interest, as what
Mr. Justice Story calls . . . a dependent bill."' 143 Then in 1886, in
Phelps v. Oaks,144. the Supreme Court held that the intervention of a
is that the federal court already has jurisdiction of one action, and intervention avoids
the necessity of another action. But this argument would seem to overlook the dis-
tinction between cases cognizable in the federal courts, and those cognizable only in
the state courts.
140. 65 U. S. 450 (1860).
141. Id., at 460. Intervention cases should be distinguished from substitution cases.
See Monmouth Inv. Co. v. Means, 151 Fed. 159 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906) ; Caufliel v. Lawrence,
256 Fed. 714 (M. D. Tenn. 1919) ; Chester v. Life Ass'n of America, 4 Fed. 487 (W. D.
Tenn. 1880).
142. 110 U. S. 276 (1884).
143. Id., at 283, 284.
144. 117 U. S. 236 (1886).
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landlord as a defendant in a possessory proceeding against his tenant
was within the jurisdiction of the federal court even though the inter-
vener and the plaintiff had the same citizenship. And one year later,
in Osborne v. Barge,"4" which was a foreclosure suit, the federal circuit
court for the northern district of Iowa permitted the owner of a part
of the mortgage being foreclosed and the assignees of the mortgagor
to intervene. The interveners had the same citizenship as the original
complainant who was made defendant in the interveners' cross action.
Phelps v. Oaks and Osborne v. Barge have been followed in numerous
cases. Creditors have been permitted to intervene in the dissolution
proceedings of a partnership, 4 ' even though they lacked the requisite
diversity. The holder of a deed of trust on partnership real property
has been held to have a right to intervene in an accounting suit brought
by the wife of a partner against the co-partner, despite a lack of diversity
as to the creditor.14T The lessor of rails has been permitted to intervene
in a receivership proceeding for recovery of the leased rails, although
there was a lack of diversity between the intervener and his adversary."
In addition, the interveners were permitted to bring in new parties,
some of whom did not have requisite diversity as to the interveners. 14 0
Junior bondholders also may intervene in a receivership notwithstanding
a lack of diversity, and they may also bring in new parties.sa The
145. 30 Fed. 805 (N. D. Ia. 1887). In United Electric Securities Co. v. Louisiana
Electric L. Co., 68 Fed. 673 (E. D. La. 1895), the suit was by a stockholder asking for
the appointment of a receiver in order to take the management and the property out
of the hands of the board of directors. An intervening petition was filed by the New
Orleans Traction Company, which had the same citizenship as the defendant The
court allowed the intervention on the basis that jurisdiction over the intervener was
dependent "upon the controversy between the securities company and the light company;
and, unless there is such a controversy, and one, too, that dravs to the court the pos-
session and control of the property of the light company, the case or controversy of
the traction company with the electric light company must be left out of consideration."
146. Lackner v. McKechney, 252 Fed. 403 (C. C. A. 7th, 1918).
147. Minot v. Mastin, 95 Fed. 734, 738 (C. C.A. Sth, 1S99). " . . . The pro-
ceeding which was inaugurated by filing that complaint vas of a dependent or ancillary
character, since the power of the court to entertain it was derived, not from diversity
of citizenship as between the parties thereto, or the existence of a federal question,
but solely from the jurisdiction which it had already acquired in the pending case
148. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Byrnes, 24 F. (2d) 66 (C. C.A. 8th, 1923);
and see Wabash RMR. v. Adelbert College of the Western Reserve University, 203
U. S. 39 (1908).
149. Id., at 6.
150. Compton v. Jessup, 68 Fed. 263, (C.C. A. 6th, 1895), 167 U. S. 1 (1897).
An intervener into a class action need not have independent federal jurisdictional
grounds. Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61 (1885); cf. Clauss v. Palmer Union Die
Co,, 222 Fed. 870 (C. C.A. 9th, 1915). There may be an obligation on the intervener
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retention of jurisdiction in foreclosure proceedings has resulted in the
purchaser being allowed, without independent jurisdictional grounds, to
intervene after the sale in order to rid itself of a contract which it had
failed to reject properly.' The class of cases where independent juris-
dictional grounds is unnecessary broadens, of course, as the concept
of a lien on property in the custody of the court widens.
112
A great deal of authority may be found in the cases also for the pro-
position that where the right to intervene is only discretionary, inde-
pendent federal jurisdictional grounds must be shown by the intervener.
Thus interveners claiming merely a right to payment for oil taken from
wells in the possession of a receiver were denied litigation of their claim
when they failed to show independent jurisdictional grounds, because
the circuit court of appeals, differing from the trial court, failed to find
an interest in a fund in the possession of the court.153 In a bondholder's
suit against a city to collect on the bond, taxpayers could not intervene
to enjoin payment of the allegedly void bonds without showing some
independent jurisdictional grounds to support their intervention."5 4 The
drawer of a check could not intervene in the receivership of his payee
without showing diversity or some other ground of jurisdiction when
the proceeds of the check, which the drawer claimed, had already been
to pay the rateable share of expense. Bowker v. Haight, 140 Fed. 794 (S. D. N. Y.
1905). See Illinois Steel Co. v. Ramsey, 176 Fed. 853 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910).
151. Cincinnati, Indianapolis and West Ry. v. Indianapolis Union Ry., 270 U. S.
107 (1926); cf. Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 69 U. S. 609 (1864). See Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234 (1934), where the bankruptcy court has granted a discharge,
the bankrupt may petition the bankruptcy court, without separate federal jurisdictional
requirements, to enjoin a creditor from prosecuting in the city municipal court a claim
based on a wage assignment. And see St. Louis & San Francisco R.R. v. Spiller, 274
U. S. 304 (1927).
152. In Tift v. Southern Ry., 159 Fed. 555 (S. D. Ga. 1908), where the court
found a fund in the amount of unlawful rates charged by various commd carriers,
intervention was permitted various shippers having claims to the "fund". In Brinker-
hoff v. Holland Trust Co., 146 Fed. 203 (S. D. N. Y. 1906) intervention was allowed
without discussion of jurisdiction, where the intervener would have an interest in the
res if subrogation were granted. In Carter v. City of New Orleans, 19 Fed. 659
(E. D. La. 1884) creditors, over whom priority was claimed in a creditor's suit to
secure payment from an alleged trust fund, were allowed to intervene without any
discussion of jurisdictional grounds. "At the hearing, if their rights would be lost
by a decree, the court would be compelled to notice their absence, and order the case
to stand over until they were brought in, or their rights were protected." See City
of Shidler v. H. C. Speer & Sons Co., 62 F. (2d) 544 (C. C.A. 10th, 1932), where
bondholders could intervene in a suit on municipal waterworks bonds. Note also Rice
v. Durham Water Co., 91 Fed. 433 (E. D. N. C. 1899): where intervention in a
receivership is permitted, the federal court may order the removal from a state court
of a connected cause of action by the intervener against the original defendant, despite
lack of diversity.
153. Forest Oil Co. v. Crawford, 101 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 3d, 1900).
154. Seligman v. City of Santa Rosa, 81 Fed. 524 (N. D. Cal. 1897).
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taken by the bank pursuant to its right of set-off against the payee."s
The intervener had a claim to a fund, but that fund was already "in the
bank's possession and beyond the receiver's reach."1"; Similarly, credi-
tors of the beneficiary of a spend-thrift trust could not, without showing
independent jurisdictional grounds, intervene in a proceeding for the
construction of a will when the court had only reserved jurisdiction over
the trustee in order to determine the right of the beneficiary to obtain
part of the corpus of the estate.'0 7 In the view of the Supreme Court
the trial court did not have custody or control of property which would
give the intervener an absolute right to intervene.
IV. INTERVENTION AND REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS
In the previous article, we applied the rules on intervention to receiver-
ships and reorganizations.' We showed that in an equity receivership
operating under the fiction of a judicial sale, it was important that credi-
tors and stockholders be given an opportunity early in the proceedings
to be heard on the reorganization plan. We pointed out that the interests
of creditors and stockholders had not been sufficiently protected because
of the notion that they were adequately represented. The secured credi-
tors were often said to be represented by a trustee under an indenture,159
the creditors in general were told they were represented by the receiver,2c0
and the stockholders were supposedly represented by the directors." 1
Unless some fraud cr collusion on the part of the representative could
be shown, the creditors and stockholders were thereafter denied an
absolute right to intervene. We suggested that in most cases it was
155. Fulton National Bank v. Hozier, 267 U. S. 276 (1925).
156. Id., at 281.
157. Hoffman v. McClelland, 264 U. S. 552 (1924). The Supreme Court recog-
nized that if there had been control of the property by the court intervention would
have been allowed without independent jurisdictional grounds. "Vhere in the progress
of a suit in a federal court property has been drawn into the court's custody or control,
third persons claiming interests in or liens upon the property may be permitted to
come into that court for the purpose of setting up, protecting, and enforcing their
claims---although the court could not consider or adjudicate their claims if it had not
acquired the property." Id., at 558. Cf. Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93
(19G4).
158. Moore and Levi, supra note 1, at 595. See Comment (1938) 47 Ymu. L J. 746.
159. Palmer v. Bankers Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Guaranty
Trust Co. of New York v. Minneapolis & St. L Ry., 52 F. (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 8th,
1931).
160. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Doherty, 286 Fed. 926 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923);
see Conley v. International Pump Co., 237 Fed. 286, 287 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
161. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 15 F. (2d)
434 (N. D. Ill. 1926).
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extremely unrealistic to assert that the trustee under an indenture ade-
quately represented the creditors under the indenture." 2 The so-called
corporate trustee has most often been distinguished by its inactivity,
which, whether it is justifiable inactivity or not, should not stand as a
barrier against the admittance of the secured creditors into the proceed-
ings.' -' The receiver has usually been more interested in conserving
and operating the property than in representing the claims of creditors
on a plan of reorganization. The directors are elected by stockholders
to conduct a going business, and not to preserve the interest of a par-
ticular class in a reorganization looking forward to a new company.104
We suggested, therefore, that a distinction should be made between
the formal institution of the reorganization proceeding, whatever form
that might take, the administration of the estate, and the reorganization
process.'65 We felt that in the absence of a showing of fraud or col-
lusion on the part of the representative, creditors and stockholders might
well be held to be represented adequately in the formal bringing of the
proceedings and in the administration of the estate. Even at that point,
a showing of fraud or collusion on the part of the representatives would
make the right to intervene absolute. On matters close to the reorgan-
ization process itself, we felt that creditors and stockholders ought to
have an absolute right to intervene. In applying these distinctions, then,
we suggested that as to the initiation of proceedings, the administration
of the estate under the receiver or trustee, even in the issuance of ordinary
receiver's or trustee's certificates, creditors and stockholders only have
a discretionary right of intervention.06' But as to the working out of
the reorganization plan, including the early stages of the plan, the forma-
tion of committees, the solicitation of deposits, and anything involving
the status of a class, together with matters concerning the provisions of
deposit agreements, there should be an absolute right to intervene for
creditors and stockholders, because with reference to these matters they
are not adequately represented by the trustee, receiver, and directors.
The corporate reorganization provisions have not essentially changed
the problem of intervention. Neither Section 77 nor Section 77B are
162. Moore and Levi, supra note 1, at 603; see Hazzard v. Chase Nat. Bank of
City of New York, 287 N. Y. Supp. 541 (1936).
163. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COmmIssIoN, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND IN-
VESTIGATION OF THE WoRK, ACTiviTIEs, PERSONNEL, AND FUNCtiONS OF PROTECTIVE
AND REORGANIZATION COMmITrEES; Pt. VI, TRUSTEES UNDER INDENTUES (1936) 48, 65.
164. See In re National Lock Co., 9 F. Supp. 432 (N. D. Ill. 1934).
165. Moore and Levi, supra note 1, at 606.
166. The discretionary right would become an absolute right if representation were
inadequate. Even when the right is only discretionary, no independent federal juris-




dear as to intervention; Section 77 is apparently more liberal, but neither
is satisfactory. Both sections distinguish in some measure between the
right to be heard and the right to intervene. Section 77B grants the
debtor a right to be heard on all questions in the proceedings." No
provision is made for hearing either committees or the trustee under
the mortgage indenture. Any creditor or stockholder has the right to
be heard on the permanent appointment of the trustee and on the pro-
posed confirmation of the reorganization plan. In addition, any creditor
or stockholder may be heard, upon filing a petition for leave to intervene,
"on such other questions" as the judge shall determine. This provision
is extremely unsatisfactory. It is open to the interpretation that inter-
vention may not be permitted on those matters where an absolute right
to be heard is granted by the statute, i.e., that the absolute right to be
heard is, in fact, intervention. If this is so, it is possible to argue that
there can be no right to be heard under Section 77B without an allow-
ance of intervention. This would mean that there is an absolute right
to intervene in the case where the right to be heard is absolute, and, pre-
sumably, that the right to intervene in all other cases may be only dis-
cretionary. If Section 77 is interpreted in this manner, it is less liberal
on the whole than Equity Rule 37. Furthermore, since the right to be
heard is only given to creditors and stockholders, and not to the indenture
trustee and committees, it is again possible to deny intervention to the
trustee or conmmittee on the theory that the Section means to exclude
them. 6' This also seems unfortunate. The most reasonable interpre-
tation of the Section seems to be that it gives an absolute right to be
heard, and that there is also a right to intervene, the nature of which is
not stated, and therefore ordinary rules as to intervention are applicable.
The distinction between the right to be heard and the right to inter-
vene is much clearer under Section 77 ."r The debtor, any creditor or
stockholder, the duly authorized committee, or the attorney or agent of
the trustee under an indenture have the right to be heard on all questions
arising in the proceedings. In addition, such persons or any other "inter-
ested party" may be permitted to intervene. The difficulty with this pro-
vision, however, is the danger of the possible interpretation that inter-
167. Section 77B(c) (11).
168. See Bitkser v.'Hotel Duluth Company, 83 F. (2d) 721 (C.C.A. 8th, 1936)
where it was said that the trustee under the indenture might not attack the reorgani-
zation plan. The problem of whether the trustee may file claims for non-depositing
security holders or cast votes for non-depositors in the plan is not an intervention
problem. See Its re Allied Owners Corp., 74 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. Zd, 1934).
In the reorganization of the Utilities' Power and Light Corporation, the S.E.C.
was allowed to "intercede" to request the appointment of an independent trustee. See
New York Times, Oct. 27, 1937, p. 49.
169. Section 77(c) (13).
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vention, as opposed to the right to be heard, is always discretionary. This
is probably not the case. The "may be permitted to intervene" or per-
missive language of the statute is similar to the permissive language of
Equity Rule 37 which, as we have seen, has been construed to provide
for both an absolute and a discretionary right of intervention." 0 There-
fore, the ordinary rules concerning the absolute right to intervene should
apply. Since the ordinary rules as applied by the courts, however, were
unrealistic in the determination that creditors and stockholders were
ordinarily sufficiently well represented in the proceedings, some more
definite declaration of policy would be helpful. The need for a right to
intervene is not satisfied by a right to be heard, for, as will be shown,
they are not the same, and the right to be heard is in many cases an in-
.sufficient substitute.
Since our first article, there has been a great deal of discussion con-
cerning corporate reorganization; the reports of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and various other bodies investigating under con-
gressional authority have appeared.' 7' Although intervention is generally
recognized as one of the problems of reorganization that has not been
solved satisfactorily,"7 2 we do not believe that it may be dealt with as
a separate problem. The question has two aspects. The first is that
security holders and stockholders must be adequately represented or be
allowed- and indeed encouraged- to represent themselves. Interven-
tion is one way of meeting this problem. It is not completely satisfactory
because security holders and stockholders are not entirely capable of
protecting their own interests. A compromise solution would seem to
allow intervention to committees if these committees are adequately
policed." 3 Perhaps a still better solution would be to supplement com-
mittee representation with a government official as a protagonistic repre-
sentative for each of the various classes if the size of the reorganization
warrants the expense. But this latter solution does not seem capable of
realization at the present time. The other aspect of the problem of
intervention is that it is not desirable to allow strikers to hold up the
proceedings by an undue amount of intervention and resulting appeals.",
170. Moore and Levi, supra note 1, at 581.
171. The SacuarriEs AND EXCHANGE CoMIIssION, REPORTS, supra note 163. Note,
in particular, Pts. I, III, and VI.
172. See Report of the Counsel to the Special Committee, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Sen. Doc. No. 268 (1936) (McAdoo Committee) 27: "The obvious result of dis-
couraging intervention and of shifting objection is to weld the circle of collusion that
surrounds the judge." REPoRT, Pt. VI, op. cit. mipra note 171, at 48.
173. As would be the case under the Lea Bill [H. R. 6868, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937)]; see also the Barkley Bill [S.2344, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937)].
174. See Friendly, The j935 Amendment of the Railroad Reorganization Act (1936)
36 Cor. L. IEv. 27. See generally, Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 746.
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But again this portion of the problem cannot be adequately dealt with
so long as everyone who opposes the house of issue is considered a
striker. Until a better procedure for reorganization has been developed,
we believe that the interests of stockholders and creditors warrant the
application of liberal intervention rules. Chapter X of the proposed
revision of the Bankruptcy Act, the Chandler Bill, adopts in general the
broader rules of Section 77, with the addition that it gives the Securities
and Exchange Commission unusual intervening powers.Y" While it
makes no distinction between an absolute and discretionary right to in-
tervene relative to others, it may be assumed that such a distinction will
be applied.
When intervention is requested in reorganization proceedings, it is
necessary that the intervener state his interest in the proceeding. If he
is a creditor, he must state what kind of a creditor he is.'" It is to be
hoped also that better practice will be followed and that the intervener
will be required to indicate the points which he wishes to raise in the
proceedings."7 If intervention is discretionary, the court may then find
it feasible to deny intervention altogether or to limit its scope."" Thus
a contractor who merely fears that his contract will be rejected need
not be admitted as an intervener prior to any attempt on the part of
the trustee to reject the contract.1 0 When sufficient facts are alleged in
the petition, together with a statement of the points the intervener wishes
to raise, the court may be able to conclude that the intervention is not
in good faith, and reject intervention on that ground.""0 Even where the
175. H. R. 8046 (75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1937), §206: "The debtor, the indenture
trustees, and any creditor or stockholder of the debtor shall have the right to be heard
on all matters arising in a proceeding under this chapter." § 207: "The judge may
for cause shown permit a party in interest to intervene generally or with respect to
any specified matter . . . " §203: "The Securities and Exchange Commission shall,
upon the filing of a notice of its appearance in a proceeding under this chapter, be
deemed to be a party in interest, with the right to be heard on all matters arising
in such proceeding, and be deemed to have intervened in respect of all matters in such
proceeding with the same force and effect as if a petition for that purpose had been
filed with and allowed by the judge." See also §§ 210, 213, 247, 249, 265.
176. Bryan v. Welch, 74 F. (2d) 964 (C.C.A. 10th, 1935).
177. See discussion mspra, p. 904.
17& See In re Denver & L G. Western Ry., 13 F. Supp. 821 (D. C. Colo. 1936).
The court quoted Judge Fans in an unreported oral opinion in the Matter of Pacific
1.R.: "Heretofore, ex gratia we have allowed general interventions by persons and
aggregations, who were at most entitled to come in specially. This action has had
the effect to induce numerous others to seek the privilege of general intervention;
so that the case has become unconscionably complicated, and if this grace is broadened,
it will ultimately become so unwieldy as to preclude orderly administration:'
179. Globe Grain and Milling Co. v. American Marine Products Co., 91 F. (2d)
380 (C. C-A. 9th, 1937).
180. In re Associated Gas & Electric Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 3850 (N. D.
N. Y. 1936).
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intervener has an admitted interest in the proceeding, such as the trustee
for the security holders, it may be useful to allow intervention on specific
issues, rather than generally, although this seems doubtful when a peti-
tioner with so broad an interest is involved."' Where indenture trustees
and the representative of holders of some of the securities issued under
the indentures each sought intervention, the former's petition has been
granted and the latter's denied. 82 The reason was that the former party
was the more general representative, and the latter could be admitted
later on for the purpose of raising specific issues. If sufficient facts are
stated to indicate that the petitioner is not really adequately represented
by a committee that has already intervened, the court may allow the
petitioner to intervene."8 3 Of course, if the intervener can show clearly
an absolute right to intervene, intervention will have to be allowed. And
even when the right to intervene is not absolute, it may be suggested
that the court should not be entirely captious in denying intervention,
because, for instance, the attorney for the intervener had presented the
same objections in prior chancery proceedings.18 4
It must be remembered that the right to be heard is not the same as
intervention. This has been recognized by the Seventh Circuit, which
has pointed out that the statute expressly gives only an absolute right
to a hearing, not to intervention. "The record discloses that his petition
to intervene was denied, but he was given every opportunity to be heard
on every pertinent question."' 15 A denial of intervention, then, is not
a denial of the right to be heard. One who is only given a right to be
heard, and has not intervened, has no right of appeal. Thus in In re'
Trust No. 2988 of the Foreman Trust and Savings Bank,180 it was held
that a bondholder who had appeared in the District court only upon
exceptions to the master's report and had challenged the jurisdiction of
the court and the fairness of the plan, could not appeal from a final
decree approving the final account of the trustee and the report of the
reorganization consummation. "Appellant at no stage of the proceedings
petitioned the court for leave to intervene; nor was any order ever en-
tered granting him such a right." ''  And in Public Service Commission
181. In re Missouri Pacific R.R., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 11871.11 (E. D. Mo.
1934).
182. In re Denver & R. G. Western Ry., 13 F. Supp. 821 (Colo. 1936).
183. In re United Telephone & Electric Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Sent. %4217 (1936).
184. it re General Theatres Equipment Co., 12 F. Supp. 785 (Del. 1935).
185. In re 333 North Michigan Ave. Bldg. Corp., 84 F. (2d) 936 (C. C. A. 7th,
1936).
186. In re Trust No. 2988 of the Foreman Trust and Savings Bank, C. C. H. Bankr.
Serv. 14216 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936).
187. Ibid.
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v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.,218 it was held on rehearing that the
city controller could not appeal from an order allowing certain payments
to be made, because while the controller was allowed to be heard in the
proceeding, he was not a formal party, not having been allowed to inter-
vene. In this respect intervention finds its chief distinguishing feature
from the-practice of allowing a party to appear as an anicus curiae.'80
"If the court below wanted to hear him as adviser, controller, or repre-
sentative, it could do so, but this privilege did not give him the right
to appeal as a party from the decree of the court."'0 0
On the other hand, once intervention has been allowed, the intervener
has the status of a party "for purposes of appeal. This is subject to the
qualification that where intervention is limited in scope, the intervener
can not be affected by many orders and decrees, and may not appeal
from them. The rule that an intervener has the status of a party for
purposes of appeal is, of course, the ordinary rule in regard to inter-
vention, and it has been expressly recognized by the Second Circuit as
applicable to cases arising under Section 77B.' 01 The argument against
allowing the intervener to appeal is that such procedure opens the door
to an unnecessary number of appeals, but, as the Second Circuit has
pointed out, the safeguard against too frequent appeals is to deny inter-
vention.912
The intervener, however, is given no more than the right to appeal
possessed by original parties. In the ordinary bankruptcy case, the orig-
inal parties are not allowed to appeal the allowance of claims of other
creditors unless the trustee has unreasonably refused to appeal the allow-
ance or is disqualified.' It may be, therefore, that an intervener, who
has been allowed to intervene generally in reorganization proceedings
188. 82 F. (2d) 481 (C. C.A. 3d, 1935). In In re Garment Center Capitol, Inc.,
C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 3472 (S. D. N. Y. 1935) the court in denying the right of
an individual creditor to intervene in 77B proceedings stated: "The petitioner, vithout
intervention, is entitled to notice of hearing on any proposed plan of reorganization."
See also It re Kenmore-Granville Hotel Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 4842 (C.C. A.
7th, 1937).
189. Cf. Moor v. Texas & N. 0. R.R., 297 U. S. 101 (1936) (The Solicitor General
appeared as amicus curiae to present the government's position on the Cotton Control
Act).
190. 82 F. (2d) 481, 487 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935).
191. In re N. Y. Investors, 79 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
192. Id., at 182. Cf. Comment (1938) 47 Yi.r L J. 746, at 766.
193. See Chatfield v. O'Dwyer, 101 Fed. 797 (C. C, A. 8th, 1900) ; Amic: v. Mort-
gage Security Corp., 30 F. (2d) 359 (C. C.A. 8th, 1929). But tontra is In re Roche,
101 Fed. 956 (C. C. A. 5th, 1900), which is sometimes distinguished because the
creditor claimed "a special lien in the sum in the hands of the trustee." But this is
analogous to the absolute right to intervene. And see also Pennsylvania Co. for Ins.
on Lives, etc. v. Philadelphia Co., 266 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920); 'West v. Radio-
Keith-Orpheum Corp., 70 F. (2d) 621 (C. C.A. 2d, 1934).
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will not be allowed to appeal the allowance of another creditor's claim
without showing that the trustee has unreasonably refused to do so or
is disqualified. The Eighth Circuit, impressed with the number of appeals
as to claim allowances which would be made if their ruling were other-
wise, has so held.' It was felt that "in the matter of taking an appeal
from orders allowing claims to other creditors," the intervener "was in
no better position than any creditor."'195 But intervention is allowed in
reorganization proceedings because the creditor or stockholder is not
adequately represented. Where there is adequacy of representation, inter-
vention - if it does not suit the convenience of the court - should be
denied. If general intervention signifies that the intervener is not ade-
quately represented for all purposes, a general intervener should not be
required to rely for representation on the trustee. If representation is
adequate on the matter of contesting the claims of other creditors, the
remedy is to deny intervention on this point, not to allow intervention
and then dismiss the appeal.
The ordinary rule that the appeal of an intervener follows the course
of appeal in the main proceeding seems inapplicable under the reorgan-
ization statutes, because in these proceedings different kinds of appeal
are expressly provided for the various kinds of orders that may be
appealed from. At the present time it is not always clear whether Sec-
tion 24 or 25 of the Bankruptcy Act is the applicable section to par-
ticular orders and decrees in reorganization proceedings, but intervention
presents no special problem.'96
The status of interveners in reorganization proceedings is, to an extent,
dependent upon the nature of their right to intervene. Creditors and
stockholders, we have said, should be considered as having the absolute
right to intervene on matters involving the reorganization plan. They
will not then be allowed to object to prior decrees, except in unusual
circumstances, but they will be permitted to question the jurisdiction of
the court, the propriety of further proceeding in the action, and the claims
and defenses of other parties. But if their representation is considered
adequate, the right to intervene is only discretionary. Again, they may
question the jurisdiction of the court and the claims of other parties.
They may not usually avoid prior decrees nor raise the question that
the court should not proceed.
194. Jonas v. Bellerive, 90 F. (2d) 688 (C. C.A. 8th, 1937). The court citc4
Christian v. Hoe & Co., 79 F. (2d) 541 (C. C.A. 2d, 1935) as taking a similar view,
but in that case appeal was erroneously attempted under Section 25 rather than Sec-
tion 24.
195. Jonas v. Bellerive Inv. Co., et al., 90 F. (2d) 688, 699 (1937).
196. See Meyer v. Kenmore-Granville Hotel Co., 297 U. S. 160 (1936), (1936)
31 ILL. L. REV. 58.
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Some courts have placed an additional restriction on intervening credi-
tor committees. Section 77B states that three or more creditors with
provable claims in excess of the value of the securities held by them,
if any, to $1,000 or over, or stockholders holding 5 per centum in num-
ber of all shares of stock of any class of the debtor outstanding, may
appear under certain circumistances and controvert the facts alleged in
the petition or answer as the case may be.107 Section 77 has a similar
provision allowing creditors generally to controvert the facts alleged
in the petition, but it does not mention stockholders."' From the pro-
vision in 77B, it has been argued that no other creditors or stockholders
may be allowed to intervene to controvert the facts alleged in the peti-
tion, for such permission would be contrary to the rule that intervention
must be in subordination to the main proceedings. Thus in In re 1030
North Dearborn Bldg. Corp.,"'0 the court denied intervention to the
claimant of the property of the debtor, the trustee under the indenture
for bondholders, and a bondholders committee which desired to defeat
the petition of three creditors. The court stated:
"I am of the opinion that the applicants for intervention may not
properly be admitted for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction
of the court or for the purpose of defeating the petition, but they
may be admitted upon proper petitions for intervention in subordin-
ation to and in recognition of the original proceedings . . . "
The court took the same position in It re Prairie Ave. Bldg. Corp.' O0
where intervention had already been allowed. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that a bondholders' committee
and the trustee under the indenture could not question the good faith
of a petition under Section 77B because "there is no provision for
intervention upon this issue by bondholders' committee or trustee." 20' 1
It may be argued that a bondholders' committee with only a discre-
tionary right to intervene at the preliminary stage need not be allowed
to intervene to controvert the allegations of the petition. A trustee for
the bondholders, however, has an absolute right because of his interest
in the res in the possession of the court. If either the trustee or a com-
mittee has been allowed to intervene, either ought to be allowed to con-
trovert, not the fact that a sufficient petition for the court to assume
jurisdiction with propriety has been filed-only one with an absolute right
to intervene, such as the trustee, could do that-but that the petition was
filed in good faith. This is true because the court must find that the
197. Section 77B(a). See also H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 39.
198. Section 77(a), prior to the hearing provided for in § 77(c) (1).
199. In re 1030 North Dearborn St. Bldg. Corp., 7 F. Supp. 896 (E. D. Ill. 1934).
200. In re Prairie Ave. Bldg. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 125 (E. D. Il1. 1935).
201. In re Loeb Apartments, 89 F. (2d) 461, 464 (C. C.A. 7th, 1937).
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petition was filed in good faith; it is something which the creditor must
show before he can justify his demand for reorganization of the cor-
poration.202 The statute, of course, may be read as denying this ordinary
rule of intervention, but it does not seem wise or necessary to do so.
Since the good faith of the petition is somewhat dependent on the credi-
tor's showing that reorganization is possible, which in a given case may
mean the presentation of a tentative reorganization plan, or a showing
that the bankruptcy proceeding will be more advantageous than a pend-
ing equity receivership, it would seem to be important that all inter-
veners be heard on this matter. We might even give an absolute right
to be heard on these matters to all interveners presenting claims in the
reorganization. Inasmuch as 77 and 77B are not clear in their inter-
vention provisions, an interpretation which construes them as denying
intervention on this important matter seems unnecessary. Accordingly
many courts have permitted intervention. 0" The Chandler Bill, indeed,
expressly allows "an answer controverting the allegations of a petition
by or against a debtor" to be "filed by any creditor or indenture trustee,
or, if the debtor is not insolvent, by any stockholder of the debtor."204
Reasonable restrictions, of course, may be placed on intervening credi-
tors and stockholders. The situation is somewhat similar to intervention
in class actions where the intervener is often required to pay his share
of the expenses.20 5 Failure of the intervener to "offer to contribute its
fair share of the costs and expenses" may be one reason for refusing
intervention. 206 It is not necessary that an intervener who has not proved
himself a creditor be considered as subsumed under the term "party in
interest", as that term is used in Sections 47 and 49 of the Bankruptcy
Act; he is not entitled to disclosure of the accountant's report.201  On
the other hand, the restrictions must be reasonable. The court cannot
require a surety bond before the intervener will be heard with reference
to the removal of temporary trustees.208
202. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Phil. v. University Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Seattle, 90 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937); cf. In re Utilities Power &
Light Corp., 19 F. Supp. 204 (N. D. IIl. 1937).
203. Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Phil. v. University Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Seattle, 90 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937); In re South Coast Co., 8 F.
Supp. 43 (Del. 1934) ; see In re Surf Bldg. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 295 (E. D. Ill. 1934);
it re Island Park Associates, 77 F. (2d) 334 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); In re Grigsby-
Grunow Co., 77 F. (2d) 200 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935). Cf. It re Peyton Realty Co., 18 F.
Supp. 822 (E. D. Pa. 1936).
204. Section 137.
205. Forbes v. The Memphis, El Paso & Pac. R.R., 2 Woods 323 (C. C. W. D.
Tex. 1872).
206. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 83 F. (2d) 532 (C. C. A.
10th, 1936).
207. In re Annin & Co. (U. S. Dist. Ct. S. D. N. Y. April 30, 1936, C. C. H. 3995).
208. In re Simon Manges & Son, Inc., 77 F. (2d) 493 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
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There is no doubt that the intervener may protest against the con-
firmation of a plan; the reorganization statutes give all creditors and
stockholders the right to be heard on this issue, and the intervener dearly
should have a right of appeal. As one court stated, even though no
one objected, the court would still have to consider whether the plan
was fair and equitable, and any intervener would seem qualified to raise
the objection.0 9 Interveners have also been allowed to question the
constitutionality of the statute,2 10 to object to fees,-11 and to controvert
the right of the court to appoint an investigator under the reorganiza-
tion statutes.212 Somewhat anomalously one court has held that an inter-
vening committee might not question the right of another committee
to represent certain security holders.213 This decision on any considera-
tion of status seems indefensible.
The courts have not been lenient in granting fees to interveners.
214
To the extent that intervention is necessary to protect the small security
holders, a denial of fees to their attorneys, while it will prevent strike
suits, does not seem entirely satisfactory. We may repeat our earlier
observation on this point.2
"If intervention is to be freely allowed as suggested, court super-
vision of the allowance of committee fees is a necessary corollary.
The disallowance or the allowance of inadequate fees may only
result in mulcting the depositors, or the stockholders of the new
corporation. It should be possible for a court, with the aid of Inter-
state Commerce Commission in cases arising under Section 77, and
with the aid of masters in other cases, to anticipate the amount of
fees to be allowed in a particular reorganization, the fact that inter-
vention is often sought solely to gain the allowance of fees by the
court could be taken care of by such a procedure."
209. In re Peyton Realty Co., 18 F. Supp. 822 (E. D. Pa. 1936).
210. In re New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 16 F. Supp. 504 (D. C. Conn.
1936).
211. In re Pine Block Bldg. Corp., 90 F. (2d) 238 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
212 In re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 90 F. (2d) 798 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
213. In re Follansbee Bros. Co., 19 F. Supp. 27 (W. D. Pa. 1937).
214. See In re New York Investors, 79 F. (2d) 182 (C. C.A. 2d, 1935).
215. Moore and Levi, mipra note 1, at 607.
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